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Abstract
Usual set theory is formulated in terms of closure
conditions. A typical example is the power set axiom, which
asserts closure under the operation of power set.
In Chapter I we consider set theory based on closure
conditions applied only to definable sets. We formalize this
set theory and call it ZF*. Our principal result of Chapter I
is that, provably in first-order arithmetic, ZF is consistent
if ZF* is. Our proof of this theorem uses a Skolem hull
construction and a syntactic transformation.
In Chapter II, we consider three theories of hyperarith-
metic analysis, A1-CA, 21-AC, and :1-DC. These are called
theories of hyperarithmetic analysis primarily because the
hyperarithmetic sets form a minimum w-model for each of them.
1 1We first show that £1-DC is a conservative extension of 1-CA
for purely 21 sentences. The proof is by means of an inner
model construction. Careful attention has to be paid to limit
the axioms we use to prove relevant sentences about hyperarith-
metic sets. We then show that there are theorems of 1-DC
which are not theorems of 1-AC. This is done by first
finding a suitable sentence S and considering the auxiliary
theories :1-AC + S and :-1DC + S. We then obtain our inde-
pendence result via Gdel's Theorem, by showing that
Con(Z1-AC + S) is provable in 1-DC + S. Last, we show that
£1-AC is a conservative extension, for purely 21 sentences,
of T, a natural subsystem of predicative analysis. The proof
uses an inner model construction on certain auxiliary theories.
Thus, a model for each finite subsystem of Z1-AC is obtained
as an inner model of a model of an extension, by the negation
of an instance of induction, of a corresponding finite sub-
system of T. Thus non-standard models are implicit in the
construction.
Chapter III is concerned with hierarchies (based on the
Jump operator) on recursive linear orderings. Let X be the
set of recursive linear orderings which have no hyperarithmetic
descending chains. Joseph Harrison showed that there are ele-
ments of X, which are not well-orderings, on which there are
hierarchies. We first show that under certain weak conditions
on a recursive linear ordering, that if there is a hierarchy
on it, then it must be in X. Finally, we establish the exist-
ence of a recursive linear ordering which is in X, yet on
which there are no hierarchies. The proofs of these assertions
use certain Lemmas which are proved in the following indirect
way: one assumes the Lemma is false, and then forms a theory
consisting of the negation of the Lemma together with certain
true sentences; then one shows that the resulting theory
proves its own consistency.
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9INTRODUCTION
Set theory is usually formulated in terms of closure con-
ditions. A typical example is the power set axiom, which
asserts closure under the operation of power set. In Chapter I,
we consider set theory based on closure conditions applied only
to definable sets. We formalize this set theory and call it
ZF*, and we give a consistency proof of ZF relative to ZF*.
A direct method presents itself for obtaining this rela-
tive consistency result; namely, to use a constructible set
construction, and prove within ZF* the relativized to the
constructible sets of each instance of ZF. This is, of
course, in analogy with the method of proof for the consistency
of ZF + AxC relative to ZF. However, an examination of the
basic principles needed for such a constructible set construct-
ion to go through reveals the need for the least counterexample
principle for ordinals to be provable in ZF*. By the least
counterexample principle for ordinals, we mean the schema
(3a)Pa -> (34a)Pa, where P is any formula. It does not
appear that this schema is derivable in ZF*, even if P is
restricted to have only one free variable, a. Of course, in
ZF, the schema is derivable by means of a closure condition
applied to all sets as follows: assume (3a)Pa, and fix such
an a. Then form [l0fea & P, and use Foundation to obtain
("a)Pa. This illustrates the basic difference between ZF and
ZF*, in that the closure condition, 3 lpea & Pal, is
necessarily provable in ZF* only when a is given a definition.
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Such a direct attack seems hopeless. An outline of our
proof can be found in Section 4 of Chapter I.
Towards the end of Chapter I, we show how to add elements
"on top of" a model of ZF, to obtain nonstandard models of
ZF*. By this means, we obtain results concerning independence
from ZF*.
In Chapter II, we consider three theories of hyperarith-
metic analysis. These are A1-CA, I1-AC, and Z1-DC. Here
CA refers to comprehension axiom; AC, to axiom of choice; DC
to dependent choice. The hyperarithmetic sets form a minimum
w-model for each of these theories. We first prove that
£1-Dc is a conservative extension of 1-cA for purely 1
sentences. The proof is by means of an inner model construct-
ion. We show that given a model of 1-CA, if we then take
the submodel of all sets hyperarithmetic in a fixed set, this
submodel satisfies 1-DC. Careful attention has to be paid
to the way in which the notion of relative hyperarithmeticity
is formalized. The formulation in terms of hierarchies seems
to be the correct one here (not ). The usual proof that the
sets hyperarithmetic in a fixed set always form an w-model
of 2E-DC is too crude for our purposes. It uses the
comparability of all recursive well-orderings, which is a
principle too strong to be provable in A1-CA. However, if we
know, in A 1-CA, that given orderings have hierarchies (based
on the Jump operator) on them, we can then conclude, in AlCA,
their comparability. Thus, the: key point of our proof of the
conservative extension result is the Judicious use of
11
hierarchies on orderings.
Our inner model construction can, in the standard way, be
transformed into a finitary consistency proof of 1_-DC rela-
tive to A1-CA.
The second result of Chapter II is the independence of
£-DC from 1-AC. It would seem to be the case that a Cohen
type argument would be not only useful here, but perhaps neces-
sary. We found that quite the contrary is true. Our proof
does not use a Cohen type argument, and Cohen type arguments
do not seem to be helpful here, since it seems difficult to
find Cohen type models (starting with the standard model, the
hyperarithmetic sets, of Z1-AC) which do not have the
following property: any arithmetical predicate (in x) satis-
fied to have a solution in the new model has a solution hyper-
arithmetic (in x) in the new model. This property can be seen,
from our Theorem 1 of Chapter II, to imply that the new model
satisfies 1-DC.
Instead, we use G8del's theorem. We choose a sentence S
and consider the auxiliary theories Z1-AC + S and -1DC + S.
We show that Z-1_DC + S proves the consistency of Z1-AC + S.1 1
So if 1_-DC + S = Z1-AC + S, then Z1-DC + S is inconsistent.
But S is chosen to be a true sentence; so 1_DC f 1_AC.
Notice that the assumption Con(M -DC + S) is needed for
the independence. We do not know if there is a finitary inde-
pendence proof (i.e., a finitary proof of consistency of
Z 1-AC + ~F relative to -AC, for some F that is provable
in z1 -oDC).1
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The key property of 21-DC is that for any n21 sentence,
B, one can construct, in £1-DC + B, an W-model for B. The
key property of the sentence S is that the theory Z 1-AC + S
is equivalent, in 21-DC, to an extension of induction by a
IT2 sentence. S intuitively says that for all sets x, every
recursive well-ordering in x has a hierarchy starting from x.
More information may be obtained than independence. We
see that -DC + S proves Con(Il-AC + S); hence £i-DC
proves S -> Con(21-AC + S), which is a purely 12 sentence.
Furthermore, an examination of our proof yields that C:-AC
together with only a finite number of instances of no parameter
£1-DC is needed to prove S -> Con(l1-AC + S). Finally,
2-DC + S proves 3 an w-model for Z1 -AC + S. From all this1 1
we can conclude that there is a purely 1 sentence which is
provable in ZI-AC together with a finite number of instances
of no parameter 1-DC, but which is not an w-consequence of
£1-AC. (An instance of no parameter 1-DC is the same as
Z -DC, except the hypothesis, (f)( 3g)A(f,g), must have A
arithmetical with no free variables other than f and g.)
The last result in Chapter II is concerned with the
relation between ZI1-AC and a certain natural subsystem of
predicative analysis, T. T represents the first cO levels
of predicative analysis. We show that 1-AC is a conservative
extension of T for purely U1 sentences. This result,
together with the known characterization of the provable
ordinals of T, gives the provable ordinals of Z1-AC. Fur-
thermore, our proof of conservative extension uses an inner
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model construction, which can be transformed into a finitary
proof of consistency of 1i-AC relative to T. Now T is
known to have a predicative consistency proof; and so, then,
must 21-AC.
The relative consistency result is somewhat surprising,
since the minimum -model of ZI-AC is so much larger than
the minimum w-model of T. With this in mind, it is not
surprising that nonstandard models (i.e., non-w-models) must
be essential in our proof. In the proof, we obtain a model of
each finite subsystem of £1-AC as an inner model of a model
of an extension, by the negation of an instance of induction,
of a corresponding finite subsystem of T.
In Chapter III, we consider which elements of W* have
hierarchies. We generalize W* to include recursive linear
orderings whose field is not necessarily w. We also genera-
lize hierarchies, so that at successor we merely have a set in
which the Jump of the set at the predecessor is recursive; at
limits, we have a set in which the effective union of the
previous sets is recursive. Harrison proved that 3 neW*-W on
which there are hierarchies, in the less general sense W*, W
and hierarchies. He left open whether every neW* has a
hierarchy. We answer it in the negative for our general notion
of hierarchy and the less general notion of W*.
We also show, under weak conditions, that if n has a
hierarchy, then neW*.
The proofs use certain Lemmas which are proved in the
14
following highly indirect way: we assume the Lemma is false,
and form a theory by adding true sentences to the negation of
the Lemma; we then show that the resulting theory proves its
own consistency.
15
CHAPTER I
1. General Situation. Suppose we are given a comprehension
axiom (x1 )... (xn)(3y)Rxl...xny. We are interested here in
forming the derived schema consisting of the axioms
[(3 tx1 )(3 x2 )... (3!xn)(FlX1 &...& Fnxn) ->
(3x )(3x2 )... (3xn ) (FlX1 & F2x2 &...& Fn n & (y)Rx 1 ...xn),
where the Fi are formulae with only the free variable xi.
We are purposely vague about the general situation (what
is a comprehension axiom?), since we have only looked at this
derived schema when the original axiom is drawn from a natural
set of axioms, such as ZF, or analysis, or other naturally
occurring systems.
More specifically, we will look at the schema of schema
formed by taking the union of all the schema defined above
corresponding to each of the comprehension axioms of ZF. We
will not perturb the other (non-comprehension) axioms of ZF,
except in minor ways. We call this derived theory ZF*. (We
inessentially modify the Replacement schema in ZF for
convenience, so that each instance is appropriately placed in
the form (x1)...(Xn)(3y)Rxy, so that we may pass to the
derived schema in the manner above.) The axioms of ZF and
ZF* are spelled out in detail, in an elegant form, in the
next section.
We are interested in the relation between ZF and ZF*
as axiomatic theories. Our main result is that
IFET ConZF* -> ConZF. It is obvious that ZF* is a sub-
system of ZF.
2. Remarks on Terminolo and Notation. The only (standard)
symbols that can occur in a formula of ZF (or ZF*) are the
2 2-ary relation symbols "=", " e; the 2 quantifiers (3x) and
(x); the propositional connectives; and variables xi, Yi,
zi , ui, vi, etc. Everything else is nonstandard; when
nonstandard symbols occur in a formula, they are meant to be
expanded out in such a way that the mere occurrence of a
non-standard symbol implies existence of the corresponding
set. For example, x = y is an abbreviation for
(3z) (w)(wez (3u)(weu & uz)) & x - z]. Also, say, e x
would be (3y) [ (z)(z y) & yex].
3. Axioms. For ZF, we have
0. Axioms for predicate calculus with equality.
1. Extensionality. (x0 = xl) ( 2)(x2 e x - 2 e x1 ).
2. Infinity. (3 xO)( e x & (x1 )(x1 e x0 -> x1 U {x1 le x0 )).
3. Power set. (xO)(3 l)(X2 )(x2 ex1 - (x3)(x3ex2 -> x3 x0 )).
4. Sum set. (x0)( 3 xl ) (x2 ) ( x 2 e x l (3x3 )(x3 ex0 & x2 ex3 )).
5. Replacement schema. Let Axy be a formula with the free
variables x and y and possibly more free variables Xl,..,x n .
Then
17
(X)''' (n) (Y)[ (3Y1 ) (Y2 ) (Y2 E Y1 - (3Y3 ) (AY3Y2 & (Y4)
(Ay3Y4 -> Y4 = Y2 ) & Y3 E ))J
is an instance. (The domain is y and the axiom asserts the
range of the partial function, A'y3y2 = AY3y2 & (z)
(Ay3z -> z = Y2 ), on the domain y, exists.)
6. Foundation. (xO)(xO 0 -> (3 x l ) (x l ex & (x2 )(x 2 ex ->
x2 xO ))).
It is clear that by the usual process of making partial
functions into total functions axiom schema 5 is the same as
the usual formulation in the present context.
Now let Ax be a formula of 1 free variable. Then the
formula (3y)(x)(x e y - Ax) is abbreviated as CA.
For ZF* we have
0. Same as ZF.
1. Same as ZF.
2. Infinity. (3xo)(0 E xO & (Xl)(X 1 e x O -> xU [X1 e xO )
& (y)(y E x 0 Fin(y)). Fin(y) will be defined later.
Intuitively it means y is a finite ordinal.
3. Power set. The instances are CA -- > ( 3 xO)(x 1 )
(x1 e xO - (x2)(x2 x 1 -> Ax 2)), A with 1 free variable.
4. Sum set. The instances are CA - ( 3 x 0 )(x 1 )(x l1 x O -
(3x 2 ) ( xI e x2 & Ax2 )), A with 1 free variable.
5. Replacement schema. The instances are CA -> (3xo)(xl)
(x1 E x0 - (3x2)(Ax2 & Bx2x1 & (x3 )(Bx2x3 -> x3 = Xl))), for
A with 1 free variable, B with exactly 2 free variables.
6. Same as ZF.
Remarks: Our formulation of Power set in ZF* is seen
to be equivalent to the derived schema of Power set in ZF
(as given in General Situation) by noticing 1) that if
(3 y)Fy, then CA, where A is (3y)(Fy & xy) and 2) that
if CA, then (3!x)(y)(yEx - Ay). These latter are obtained
by axiom 1 of ZF*, Extensionality. The same remark applies
to Sum Set.
Essentially the same idea yields that the union of the
derived schema of the instances of Replacement in ZF is equi-
valent, in the present context, to the schema
(CA1 & C A) >-- > (3xO)(xlExO (3x2)(Ax2 &
B(x2,x fxl A 1x, [x lA2 3,,[x l... Anx 3) & (x3)(B(x2,x 3, [xfA1x,...
{XIAnX}) -- > X3 = 1 ) ) ) ,
where B has n + 2 free variables, A and the Ai have 1
free variable. We want to show this schema is contained (in
the present context) in Replacement in ZF*. But the above is
easily seen to follow from that instance of 5 of ZF*, setting
A as A, Bxy as (CA1 &...& CAn) -> B(X2,xl,fxA 1XX,
{x A2x3 ,.. ., x Anx}). (That the above schema contains Replace-
ment in ZF* is obvious.) NOTE: "In the present context"
means "using the other axioms of ZF*."
4. Outline of Proof of Main Theorem. The main theorem is
ENTConZF* - -> ConZF. The first step in proving this is
developing in ZF* an adequate definition of ordinals, which
18
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turns out to be a much more delicate matter than for ZF, due
to the lack of certain key instances of Replacement in ZF*.
By an adequate definition of ordinals in ZF*, we mean a
definition of ordinals such that provably in ZF*, members of
ordinals are ordinals, and (for a natural definition in ZF*
of w) w is an ordinal, and ordinals are comparable by e,
and the e-relation on the ordinals is transitive, and antisym-
metric, and antireflexive, and every ordinal has a (natural)
successor, except possibly the greatest ordinal. (It even
turns out that in ZF* we can prove there is no greatest
ordinal for our definition of ordinal given later.) The
definition is made and Lemma 1 establishes the above properties
for it in the next section; we even obtain more: that,
provably in ZF*, the new definition of ordinal coincides with
the usual definition given in ZF, on definable sets. (This
is made precise in Lemma 1, f).)
Next we develop an adequate definition of L within ZF*.
Among the properties of the predicate x L needed, we must
have, provable in ZF*, every member of an x E L is L,
w L, the new definition of x L coincides with the usual
definition of constructibility for definable x, and a
definable well-ordering of L.
With this machinery, an apparently straightforward
"proof" of our main result comes to mind. Namely, Just to
prove the relativized to L of each instance of ZF in ZF*
by taking least counterexamples of various things in ZF*, as
G6del established the relativization of the axioms of ZF to
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L within ZF. But a moment's reflection will reveal that one
can hardly expect that ZF* will prove any general least
counterexample principles; i.e., one may well be able to prove
in ZF* that (3 x)(xeL & Px), yet not be able to prove
(3ix)(xeL & Px) in ZF*, where U is defined in terms of
the definable well-ordering of L. In fact, we do not even
see how to prove each instance of the relativized of ZF* to
L, within ZF*!
In order to get our main result, we form an auxiliary
system ZF*' C ZF*, whose definition depends on a certain
crucial transformation on sentences, T. This subsystem has
the property that each instance of ZF*' semi-relativized
(semi-relativization is a certain modification of relativi-
zation) to L, is provable in ZF*. We form another
auxiliary theory ZF' which is related to ZF*' about as
ZF + V = L is to ZF*. It turns out that ZF' ZF. It
also turns out that in the theory obtained by semi-relativizing
each comprehension axiom of ZF*' and retaining the other
axioms, one can give a Skolem hull argument for each finite
subsystem of ZF' that proves the existence of a (suitably
definable) model of this finite subsystem, and hence its
consistency.
Putting all this together we get a finitary proof that (n)
ZF COn(ZFn ) . So FENTConZF* -> ConZF.
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5. Development of Ordinals. We define Ordx = Trans(x) &
e-Conn(x) & (x is semi-closed under succession) & there are
no 3-chains in x, i.e., Ord(x) = (y)(z)((ycx & zEy) -> zcx)
& (y)(z)((yE-x & zx) -
[ (w)(WEz -- (wey v w=y))
ZE & (wey V w=y)]). W
y Q x) -> (y x v y=x))
(x C_ y v yC x)). Ord"
It is obvious that (x)
For Ord(x), we define
y =x U {x.
Lemma 1: The following
free variable:
- yZ V ZE v y =
& (zex v z=x)I) &
e define Ord'(x)
- Ord"(x) - Ord'(
will be our noti
(y)(Ord"x & Ord"y
y is successor
z)) & (y)(yex ->
: (y)(z)(w)([yez &
= Ordx & (y)((Ordy
x) & (y)(Ord'y ->
on of ordinal in
-> (xc y v yEx v y'
of x if and only
are Theorems of ZF*, where
(3z)
&
ZF*.
=X)) 
if
If Ordx & yx,
If Ord'x and
then Ordy.
yEx then Ord'y.
c ) For
For
d) If C
e If y
f ) If y
g ) Ord"(
h) If y
Proof
Trans (x),
v y=w. We
3-chain.
z EX and
x with
Ord(x), x
Ord(x),
a succe
)rd" (x) and yex
r = {xAxI, Ord'(
r = fxiAx}, Ord(y
(w). (Explained 1
r= xlAx}, and 
: a) Claim Trai
we have wEx aj
can't have yew
So wey. To see
WEx, and so zEc
and x not a successor,
ssor, x = y yi, we have
then Ord"(y).
y), then Ord"(y).
), then Ord"(y).
below.)
Ax -> Ord"(x), then Ord
ns(y). Let zy, wz. Th,
nd yx. By -Conn(x), w
v y=w because we would h;
-Conn
w V WEZ
ltJx = x.
t.Jx = y.
t" Vly).
en by
Ey V yEW
ave a
(y), let zey, wey. T'
v w=z by -Conn(x).
hen
a)
b)
Ax has 1
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Towards showing y semi-closed, let zey. Hence zex, and
z lJ zIex or z U {zi = x. By e-Conn(x), we have
z U f{zey or z Lt (zz = y or yez U (z}. But if
yez Ut {z}t, then yez v yz. The first yields the 3-chain
zey, yez, z=x; the second yields yey, which yields the
3-chain yey, yy, yey. So yz U {z.
Now suppose ab, bec, (cea v c=a), a,b,c,ey. Then a,b,cex,
and we have a 3-chain in x.
b) By a), we have Ord(y). Towards showing Ord'(y), let
z ' y, Ord(z). By Trans(x), z C x. Hence zex v z=x. But
z4x, for if z=x, then xC y, and hence yey. So zex. By
e-Conn(x), zey v z=y v yez. But yz, since if yez, then
Y Ey.
c) Let Ord(x), x with (y) (y U yi x). By Trans(x),
every member of a member of x is a member of x. So UxC x,
if Ux exists. Now let yex. By semi-closure of x,
yU {y) ex. But yeyU {y}, and so x =- Ux, since also every
member of x is a member of a member of x. If x = z U {zl,
then again Ux C_ x, if Lix exists. But zx, since x has
no 3-chains. So Ux C z, if it exists. But every member of
z is a member of x, since if wz, then w is a member of
a member of x. So lJx exists and is z.
d) By c), Ord'(y). Let Ord'(z). Then x z z x. If
xC z, then yC z. If z . x, then zex v z=x. If z=x,
then y '. x. If zex, then yez v zy .v z=y. Hence x y v
y _ z.
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e) Let Ord' (y), y = {xJAx . Then either
1) All elements of y are Ord". Then let z be any
Ord . For every xEy we have x C z v z x. Either all
members of y are z or some member of y D z. Suppose
the first holds. Then if y is not a successor, by c) we
have Uy y, and so yC z. If y = u u then u C z.
Since Ord'(z), we have uEz v u=z. If u=z, then zC x.
If uez, then y_ z.
Suppose the second holds, i.e., some xEy contains z.
Then clearly z C y. So y is ord".
2) Some element of y is not Ord". We have ust
proved that any Ord' such that every member is Ord" is
Ord". The (unique) e-least element of y which is not Ord"
is definable, and has every member an Ord". (There is a least
by suitable use of Replacement schema of ZF*, and Foundation.)
Just apply 1) to obtain a contradiction.
f) We merely have to show all definable Ords are Ord'. As in
e) we go down to a definable Ordinal all of whose members are
Ord". Let y be such an ordinal, y = xfBxl. Let z y,
Ordz. We wish to show zEy v z=y. Suppose zfy & yz. Then
3 wEy with w·z. But since Ord"w, we have w z v z w.
If z w then z=w v zw and so zcy. So w z, w z. Now
either w U wc)y v w U w] = y. If wl U w) = y then since
z C y, z=w, and so zey. So w U {w]Ey. Now then Ord"
(wU f w]). Hence wU f {wJ)C_ z v z C w U {w). The first is
out, so zC wl {w], and since Ord'(w tl (w}) we have
z = w U {w) v zEW U (w], either one implying zey.
We now explain Axiom 3. Fin(x) = Ordx & (3y)(x=y
(z)(zex -> (3 w)(z=w U wl)). x is a successor
Ordx & (3y) (y=x U 
ZF*.
Now clearly w
show Ord(w).
1) Trans(w).
successor Ord or
successor Ord or
Ord or 0, and so
SC) XEW.
2) s-Conn (w)
nn & mn & nm. Tt
There is an -least
Now k d 0, since
I xi). We let w be the x0 in Ax. 2 of
is definable, and so we merely have to
Let new. Let xen. Then x is a
0. Since n is transitive, x is a
0 and every member of x is a successor
x is a finite Ord (i.e., Fin(x)), and
. Suppose 3 new such that for some me
ake any -least such n and call it k.
by Replacement in ZF* and Foundation.
em v 0=m, for any mew, by Foundation
and Trans (m). Hence
and by Trans(w), lew
m k & knm & (lem v me
mel, then mck. If
k:=m v kem. Contradic
and the comparability
3) Semi-closur
directly from Axiom 2
4) No 3-chains
k is a sulccessor
. We must have, f
1 v m=l). But if
lm then 1 1 1
tion, by the lack
of 1 and m.
e under succession
of ZF*.
· Suppose nem, m
Ord, and
or some me'
m=l then
= mvlU
of 3-chains
k=lU Il
W, k n &
mek. If
l) em, i
in Ords,
. This is insured
er, rn v r=n, where
n ,m, rEW.
have rer,
contradict
By Trans(r), we have nr. By Trans(r) again,
if ren. If r=n, we also have rr. These
Ord(r).
g)
and
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Ord y)
Ord =
.e.,
we
W,
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h) We have only to show Ord ~(Uy).
1) Trans ~Jy). If z Jy, then zew for some Ord"(w),
wey; hence any uez has uEw, wey. So u&Jy.
2) s-Conn y). If z,wE Uy, then zez' Iy,ww'EY,z',w'
both Ord". So z w' or w z'. Without loss of generality,
assume z' C w'. Then zew', wEw'. Hence zew v wz v w=z.
3) Semi-closure. Let ze Uy. Then zewey, Ord"(w).
So z U {z}Ew or ZJfzew. In the first case, z U FzIE Uy.
In the second suppose
A) some ucy has w C u, but wu. Hence weu, and
so z U {z} = we Uy.
B) Every ucy has either w=u or u w. Then clearly
Uy = w = z (z3.
A) and B) are exhaustive.
4) No 3-chains. Suppose aeb, bec, (cea v c=a), where
a,b,c e Uy. Then a,b,c are Ord", and aEc. If cea, then
cec. If c=a, aec, then cec. Contradicts Ord(c).
6. Develo nt of L. We wish to define a class of sets, L,
which has a definable well-ordering, and provably so in ZF*.
L, of course, will not be an object. We are interested in
the predicate xL.
We let n,m,r,p,q be special variables for elements of w.
We let a,p,,y,... be special variables for sets x with
Ord"x. We write a+l for a 'U {a}. We let X be a special
variable for limit (non-successor and non-null) Ord"'s.
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We say x=M ( a ) (3f)(Domf = a+l & f(0) = & (X)(Xca+l
--> U f(x) = f(X)) & ()(Bea+l -> f (+l) = Fodo(f(B)) &
XEX
x=f(a)), where Fodo(y) = x (3xo)(3n)(x=(zlzey & <y,ey> 
n(z)[xo]l & FinSeq(x,y))], where <yey> n(z)[xO ] means
the structure <y,e y> satisfies the formula with G6del
number n at the sequence of elements of the domain y, (z,xo) ,
which is the sequence starting with z, followed by the
sequence xO.
Remark on formalization: We formalize the satisfaction relation
in ZF* the same way we do in ZF. Also see 2. Remarks on
Terminoloy and Notation.
Lemma 2: For each Ax with 1 free variable, and for each
Czyl...Yn' and Bzw with only free variables shown, the
following is provable in ZF*: If y ={xjAx. and if Bzw is
a well-ordering of y U y}, and Y1,'''yYn E y, then
tzlzey & <Yey> n(z)[Yl1 ,...,Y n]} z= (zlzy & CY 1 ... yn]
where n is the Gdel number of C. Thus Fodo(x) means the
set of all sets first-order definable over x, for definable
sets x.
Proof: Suppose Czy1 is (3w)(wez & way1 ). We note that
both (zlzey & Czy1l.. and {zlzey & <ys > = n(z)[yl] exist
by Replacement on the definable y. We want to show Czy 1
<ysy> = nlzvyl ] , for zy. The proof in the case of ZF
is routine. What complicates it in the case of ZF* is that
certain sets definable in terms of the members of y may not
provably exist in ZF*, and also that the theory of Gdel
numbering may not be formalizable in ZF*. The latter is not
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the case, since w is definable, and hence by Replacement and
Foundation, induction on w provably holds in ZF*, and also
we may define + and x, and prove the relevant properties.
What comprehension axioms are needed to establish our equi-
valence? Apparently, what's involved is ust that the theory
of finitely hereditary sequences of elements of y and natural
numbers provably in ZF* have the intended interpretation.
For instance, we must verify provability in ZF*, for sentences
like "for every Yl,y2,y3Ey, n,mew, there exists the sequence
<{yl,n],{n,mll],[y2 ,Y3,fnfl>." Such sentences can clearly be
proved by suitable instances of Replacement in ZF* for
definable sets Y1,Y2,y3, and n,m. One assumes in ZF* that
such a sentence in false, and goes to definable counterexamples
Y1,Y2,y3 and n,m via the definable well-ordering of y ! (y,
Bzw.
Lemma 3: Each instance of the following is provable in ZF*:
a) [a = xAx3 & (=a v pea) & (3x)(x=M(B))] -> 3f satis-
fying the conditions given in the definition of x=M(B).
b) a - xJAx -> (3 !x0 )(x0=M(a)). Also Pea = xfAx3 ->
(3x o ) (Xo=M(P)).
Proof: Assume a = {xjAx & (3x)(x=M(a)). Suppose we
have 2 functions f,g satisfying conclusion, and f g. We
take, using Replacement and Foundation in ZF* in the usual
way, B to be the -least element of a + 1 with the property
that 3f and g, fg satisfying definition of x=M(a), with
f(B) g(P). Then B is definable. Suppose Lim(B). Then
use Replacement on $ to get the fyl (3 y) (ye & for all f
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satisfying definition of x=M(a), f(y) = y)l. We can apply
sum set in ZF* to get a union, U. In any f satisfying
the definition of x=M(a), clearly f(B) = U. But this is
contrary to hypothesis, f(B) g(B).
Now suppose = 6+1. By hypothesis, f(6) is fixed
when f varies over the functions satisfying the definition
of x=M(a). Clearly f(8+l) = Fodo(f(b)) for any f satis-
fying the definition of x=M(a), and so f(6+1) is also
independent of f, again contradicting the definition of i.
Clearly 0.
So no such B exists.
Now suppose for some Bea, part a) false. Take least
such B, and apply above, since least such B is definable.
This concludes part a).
b) Now suppose (3!xo)(xo=M(p)) for all BEa, but not for
= a. We may assume this without loss of generality, by taking
least counterexamples. We
obtaining a contradiction.
in ZF* on a we can get
write M(B) for that x
Thus we may take the union
Now it is not hard to see,
replacement there is an f
PEa, and (a ,U>, and that
definition of U=M(a). So
from a). Suppose a = T-l.
conclude the proof of Lemma 3 by
Suppose Lim(a). Using Replacement
the set of all M(p)'s, Pea. (We
with xo=M() if it is unique.)
by sum set in ZF* and call this U.
under our hypothesis that using
consisting of only <P,M(P)>'s,
this is the required f in the
(3xO )(xo=M(a)). Uniqueness comes
It is easy to see that y is
definable and by our hypotheses, f(y) is definable. It is
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obvious that elements of Fodo(f(y)) are elements of P(f(y))
and that P(f(y)) exists by power set in ZF*. Furthermore,
Fodo(f(y)) exists since it can be gotten by replacement on
P(f(y)). Proceed as above to get an appropriate f to give
Fodo(f(y)) = M(a). Uniqueness follows from a). The case
a = 0 is trivial.
We want to insure in ZF* there being a definable well-
ordering of L (among other things). This insurance is easily
obtained by a natural definition of L in ZF, but not in ZF*.
We have no choice but to complicate the definition of L by
adding on conditions.
We define xEL, approximately as (3a)(3y)(y=M(a) & xy).
But this is not good enough for our purposes. We define 5
extra conditions on this a and y:
1) (0)(z)([z=M(3) & xz)] -> (a v =a)), and
(z)(z=M(a) --> z=y). Whenever x and a have such a y, we
say O(x) = a.
2) For all yea, there is a unique corresponding y=M(B),
and if B,y < a, then M(B) q M(y).
3) The M(B)'s, Bea, and M(a) are transitive sets.
4) For every zEM(a), we have (3p)(O(z) = ) and
O(z) < a. Also if z,w M(a), then [ (zeM(O(w)) -> O(z)<O(w)] .
5) Now, there is a usual definable mapping F in full
set theory (identity this with the 2-ary relation F(x) = y)
mapping the constructible sets 1-1 into ordinals. Of course,
ZF* may well not be able to prove (x)(3 y)(F(x) = y). Cond-
ition 5) will be that (the 2-ary relation) F is a 1-1
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function when restricted to domain M(a), and
(x)(xM(a) -> Ord"(F(x))). (This is the F which, in full
set theory, assigns (GCdel numbers in the form of ordinals)
to each constructible set a sequence of ordinals, the first
being the rank of the set in the constructible hierarchy, a+l;
the rest of the sequence codes in, via F on the sets in M(a),
how the constructible set in question is first-order defined
over M(a).)
We define xeL = (3a)(3y)(vy=M(a) & XEy & a and y
satisfy conditions 1)-5) above).
We define x < y = xEL & yeL & F(x)eF(y), for F as in 5).
Lemma 4: The following are provable in ZF*: if xeL then
(y)(yeM(O(x)) -> yL). Also (y)(yex -> yeL), if xcL.
Proof: Let yM(O(x)). By 4)
we have y, M(O(y)), O(y) satisfy
nition of yL, since O(y) • O(x)
the definition of yL, let zM(O
(3a)(O(z) = a). O(z) _ O(x), for
contradiction via condition 2) in tl
rest of condition 4) follows for y
being satisfied for y, and that
y satisfies 5)
in the definition of
1), 2), and 3) in the 
. Towards verifying 4
(y)). Then zeM(O(x))
suppose not. Then we
he definition of xL.
because of condition
M(O(y)) C_ M(O(x)).
xeL,
defi-
) in
. Then
get a
The
i4)
(i.e., y, together with O(y), M(O(y))
since x does, and M(O(y))C_ M(O(x)).
To show (y)(yex -> yeL), notice
have (assuming yx) that yM(O(x)),
part of Lemma 4, yeL.
by Trans(M(O(x)) we
and so by the first
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Lemma 5: For each Ax, 1 free variable, B = {xjAx3 ->
(x)(xEM(B) --> xcL), is provable in ZF*. (Note that M(B)
exists unambiguously by Lemma 3.) Also wEL.
Proof of Lemma 5: Form aljac & M(a) does not satisfy
conclusion}. Take e-least member, and call it y. Case 1. y
is a limit. Now y is definable in ZF*. Let xM(y). Then
xeM(a), for some ay, and hence by the definition of y,
xEL. Case 2. = + 1. Let xM(6+l ) . There is a definable
well ordering on M(5), <, and we may use this to definably
well-order, in ZF*, the finite sequences of elements of M(6)
in the natural way, proving in ZF* that it is a well-ordering.
With this well-ordering of M(+1), we take a least, in M(6+l),
x such that there is no a, M(a) satisfying condition 1,
assuming there is an x. This least x is definable in ZF*,
and so we consequently can form {aClaE+l & xEM(a)I and take
the e-least member, thereby obtaining a contradiction.
So every xcM(6+l) possesses a (unique) O(x).
Conditions 2)-4) are treated similarly, taking definable
counterexamples and using definable well-orderings. The proof
of 5), after taking least counterexamples, is much like our
indication of construction of a definable well-ordering of
M(+l) ) on the basis of one for M(5), above.
To show weL, it suffices to prove wM(w+l). The proof
is like the proof of this fact in ZF.
Lemma 6: HZF (x)(x=uW-_(x=w)), where A is A relativized
to the predicate EL.
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Proof: Left to the reader.
7. The System ZF*'. We define a transformation mapping
formula in prenex form in the standard notation (described in
2. Remarks on Terminology and Notation) into formulae which
contain the '<( symbol. If B is in prenex form define B-
to be the usual prenex form for B. Take T to be the
identity on formulae with no quantifiers, and take T((3xi)Bxi)
to be (3xi)(T(Bxi) & (xj)(xj < x i -> T(B-xj))).T((xi)Bxi)
is (xi)(T(Bxi) v (3xj)(xj < xi & T(B-xj))). It is easily
proved by induction that T(B-) and XT(B) are equivalent
for any prenex B. Recall that the interpretation of xj ( xi
is xL & xeL & F(xj)eF(xi).
We form ZF*' as follows: Extensionality & Foundation &
Infinity & Power Set & Sum Set & Modified Replacement. The
latter is the only difference between ZF*' and ZF*. The
other axioms are the same. Replacement in ZF*' is as
follows: Any instance of Replacement in ZF* is an instance
in ZF*' provided that the Axy be of the form T(Bxy) &
(z)(z < y --)> T(Bxz)). Bxy having only 2 free variables. It
is obvious that ZF*' C ZF*.
Lemma 7: Extensionality & Foundation & Infinity are theorems
of ZF* when relativized to L.
Proof: For (Infinity)' take x0 to be w. For
(Extensionality)' and (Foundation)' ust note from Lemma 4 that
(xeL & yx) -> yEL.
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Lemma 8: The Power set and Sum set axioms (of ZF*) are
theorems of ZF* when relativized to L.
Proof: In power set, we have x = yfAyl. The relativized
to L will be equivalent to x = yjyEL & (Ay)'1 & xL. Now
observe that the relation (z C w)' is equivalent to z C w &
zeL & wL. So we have to verify that if xL & x = ylyeL &
(Ay)'), then there is a set xoEL with xO the set of all
subsets z of x such that zeL. Now the hypothesis tells us
that x is definable, and so x has a definable power set,
IP(x). We use replacement on IP(x) to get the set of all
O(y)'s with yEL and yElP(x). This is a definable set of
Ord", and so it has a union, .J U is definable, and so,
all y x with yeL have yeM(J), because if 1a, then
M(0) C m(a). The required set x of all subsets y of x
with yeL is in MJtl), by Lemma 2; hence xoEL, by Lemma 5.
The relativized of Sum Set is checked similarly.
Lemma 9: If (3y)(y < z & Ayxl...xn ), and O(z), O(x1 ),...,O (xn)
all Ea = fxjBxl, then 3 O(y), with y < z & Ayxl...x n .
(That is, if A any formula with the free variables shown, B
any formula with 1 free variable, the above is provable in ZF*).
Proof: One ust assumes there are counterexamples
Z,Xl,...,xn M(a) to this lemma, and then go to definable
counterexamples. But we obtain a contradiction, since there is
provably a O(y) for these supposed definable counterexamples.
Lemma 10: The semi-relativized of each of Replacement in ZF*'
is a theorem of ZF*.
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Proof: We take a particular instance of Replacement in
ZF*', e.g., that one whose Axy is T(( 3 z)(w)Czwxy) &
(u)(u < y -->T(( 3z)(w)Czwxu)), where C is quantifier-free.
We let D be a definable domain, DEL. We wish to show in
ZF* that there is a set SL of all yeL such that for some
xcL with xeD, y is the unique y with (Axy)'. This is
easily seen to be equivalent to finding a set SL of all
yEL such that for some xD,
1) xEL & yL & (3Z))L(w)L(Cwxy V (3WI)L(W, < w & Czw'XY))
& (')L(Z' < z -> (3w)L(~Cztwxy & (wt)L(wI < W -> Cztwtxy)) &
(u)L{U < y ->(z)LE (3w)L(~Czwxu & (w')L(W' < w -> Czwxu)) v
(3z')L(zt < z & (w)L(Cz'wxu v (3w t)L(w t < w & 'Cztwtxu))]].
Convenient Notation: If X and Y are expressions occurring
in 1), then let X,Y] be the subformula of 1) beginning with
X and ending with Y.
Let U = union of the O(y)'s such that 1) holds for some
xeD. We proceed to place definable bounds on the quantifiers
above in such a way that the new formula is equivalent to 1)
for xD, yMJ). (Note that for each xeD there is at most 1
y satisfying 1).)
Let fl(<x,y>) be undefined if 1 is false: be O(z)
for zeL with E(W)LCz'w'xy] otherwise. Define t!1 = union
of the range of fl on D x MJ).
Let f2 (<x,y,z>) be undefined if E(w)L,I~Czwtxy]; be
O(w) for wL with "[Czwxy, Czw'xy], otherwise. Define
= union of the range
Let f3 (<x,y,z,w>)
of f2 on D x M ) x Me 1 ).
be undefined if (w' )L(W' < w ->
otherwise b
(See Lemma
x M(U) x M(
Let f4(<x,y,z>]
'O(z') with 4[z' <
union of the range of
Let f5(<,y,z,2
be O(w) for wL with
union of the range of
Let f6 (<x,y,z, 
otherwise be PO(w')
union of the range of
Let f 7 (<x,y>)
wise be pO(u) with
of the range of f7
Let f8(<x,y,u>)
ie O(w' ) for w' with w' < w &
9.) Define U 3 = union of the range of
l1 ) x M(J2).
) be undefined if [(z')L,Cz'wxyl]; be
z, Cz'w'xy, otherwise. Define tJ =4
f4 on D x M) x M(U1).
'>) be undefined if [ (3w)L,Cz'w'xy];
[CCz'wxy,Cztw'xyj otherwise. Define U =
f5 on D x M) x M) x M4).
',w>) be undefined if r(w')L,Cz'wxy];
with wt < w & .Cz'w'xy. Define U6 =
f6 on D x M(U) x MJll) x M(U4) x MJ 5 ).
be undefined if (u)L,Cz 'w'xu]; other-
Define U 7 =,[u < y, Cz'w'xu].
on D x M(U).
be undefined if 
union
(Z )L,"CZ 'w'xu];
otherwise be O(z) for zL with ~P[(3w)L,~Cz'w'xu] . Define
U 8 = union of the range of f8 on D x M(U) x M(U7 ).
Let f9(<x,y,u,z>) be undefined if .[ (3w)L,Czw'xu];
otherwise be O(w) with wL and [Czwxu, Czwtxu]. Define
U9 = union of the range of f9 on D x MJ) x MU 7 ) x MJ 8 ).
Let fO(<x,y,u,z,w>) be undefined if [(w')L,Czw'xu];
otherwise be uO(wt) with w' < w & "Czw'xu. Define U =
union of the range of f1 0 on D x M)) x M 7 ) x M 8 ) x Ml 9).
L2'2
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Czw'xy);
,Czw ' xy.
f3 on D
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Let fll(<x,y,u,z>) be undefined if '[ (3zt,)L,Czw'wxu];
otherwise be 0O(z') with [zI < z,CzwtIxu]. Define Ull =
union of the range of fll on D x M(j) x M J7) x M 8).
Let f12 (<xy,u,z,z'>) be undefined if 4 [(w)L,v Cz'w'xu];
otherwise be O(w) for wEL with '[Cz'wxu,,Cz'w'xu . Define
U12 = union of the range of fl2 on D x Ml) x M(U7) x MJ 8 )
x MJl)-
Let f13(<x,y,u,z,z',w>) be undefined if ,[ (3 w,)L,._Cz'wIxu];
otherwise be PO(w') with w' < w & Cztwtxu. Define U 3 =
union of the range of fl on D x MVJ) x M(U7) x MPJ 8) x
Mu11) X M12)
Note that by suitable instances of Replacement in ZF*,
all of the above are provably well-defined. Note that each
ULi is definable, so that each M(Ui) C L. It is easily seen
that for xD, yMJ(U), it is the case that Axy is equivalent
to the predicate Bxy obtained by placing the bounds Mi),
1 < i < 13 on the appropriate quantifiers in 1).
Now each instance of the following is provable in ZF*:
If a = xjAx), and a a limit, then for x and yEM(a),
x < y iff x < y holds when the quantifiers in the definition
are relativized to M(a), A of 1 free variable. The proof in
ZF* of the schema is like the proof in ZF. Use the definable
well-ordering of M(a).
Now let; V = max~J,Ui,O(D)). Then relativizing the
quantifiers occurring in the expansions of the "<"ts that
occur in Bxy, to M(V+w), we get the same predicate as Bxy,
for xED. Hence we have shown our S we wanted to show
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originally EL, is first-order definable over M(V+w), and
hence EM(V+w+l), V + w + 1 definable.
8. The System ZF'. Making use of the transformation T
defined in the previous section, we form ZF' as follows:
first, Extensionality & Foundation & Infinity & Power Set
Sum Set axioms of ZF. In addition, we have (x)(xEL) & (:
(Ordx -> Ord"(x)) & (x)(3y)(z)(yEx & (zEx -> z y)).
Replacement in ZF' will be the following: Let Bxyyl...;
be a formula in prenex form with only the free variables s
Then (Yl). (Yn)(x) (3 X1) ( 2) (x2 eX1 (3x3)(x 3 &
T (Bx3x2Y1.. 'Yn) & (x4)(x4 < x2 -> )T(Bx3x4Y1 ...Yn)))), i
instance.
Lemma 11: ZF' D ZF.
Proof: First, we wish to show in ZF' each instance
and
x)
Yn
hown.
s an
of
T(A) - A. This is trivial
Suppose T(A) - A is
prenex form with n quanti
T(A) - A is provable with
prenex form. Then we will
any A in prenex form in
Let B be in prenex f
Suppose B is (3xi)(Axi).
(xj)(xj < xi v T(A-x))).
T(A-xj) is equivalent to
for A with no quantifiers.
provable in ZF'
fiers. We then
A having n +
have shown T(A)
ZFt'.
orm with n + 1
Then T(B) is
Now FZFT(Axi)
T(Axj) we have
for all A in
wish to show that
1 quantifiers in
- A provable for
quantifiers.
(3xi)(T(Axi)
Axi . Since
zFT(A-xj)
&
to check that
is provable in
& (xj) (xj(3xi ) (Ax i ) (3xi ) (Ax i
ZF '.
We have
,Axj ) )
< Xi V<x1
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Define Cxy to be y = x & T(Ay). This is, of course,
equivalent with T(Ay & y=x), a transforration on a wff of
n quantifiers. Now (x0 )(3 x1 )(x2 )(x2Exl (3x)(xEx0 & Cxx2 &
(x4 )(x4 ( x2 -> ~T(Ay & y=x))))), is (equivalent to) an axiom
of ZF'. But ZFT(Ax 2 & 2 = x3 ) Ax 2 & X2 = x 3. So
ZFI ,(x) (3xl)(x2 ) (x2exl Ax2 & x2exO). Now assume (3xi)Axi.
Choose any such xi
.
Take O(xi), and set xO = M(O(xi)),
and use the above theorem of ZF' to get the set of all elements
of M(O(xi)) having the property A. (M(O(xi)) is defined and
has required properties since (x)(xeL) is an axiom of ZF',
and xeL is formalized as in ZF*, previously.) Hence by
one of the axioms of ZF', there is a (-least member.
Hence we have shown by induction the equivalence between T(A)
and A, in ZF'. This has the effect of provably in ZF'
eliminating the T's in the axioms of ZF', and so ZF' 3 ZF.
9. The Skolem Argument. We wish to show (n) ZF* Con(ZFI n)
where ZFn is the first n axioms of ZF' in some natural
enumeration of them. If we succeed in showing this, then
suppose uCon(ZF). Then ~Con(ZF'). Then (3n) Con(ZFA).
But then (3n)ENTCon(ZF). Since ENT is formalizable in
ZF*, (3n) IF*Con(ZFn). Hence (3n)(FzF*Con(ZFA) &
F ZF* Con(ZFn)), and so Con(ZF*). Hence ConZF* -> ConZF.
We give, without loss of generality, a Skolem closure
argument within ZF* to give, provably in ZF*, a set which
is a model for 1) Extensionality in ZF, 2) Foundation in ZF,
3) Infinity in ZF, 4) Power Set in ZF, 5) Sum Set in ZF,
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6) (x)(xEL), 7) (x)(Ordx -> Ord"x), 8) (x)(3y)(z)(yEx &
z y)), 9) Let D(xyT) be the formula obtained from taking
1) in 7. The System ZF*I and replacing the 4-place quantifier-
free predicate C, with some 5-place quantifier-free predicate
E(zwxyT). (D)(T)(3S)(y)(yES (3x)(xED & D(x,y,T)).
The construction, in ZF*, of the model of these 9
sentences will be much like a Skolem construction in which the
initial model is . At each stage n, we throw in some sets
x:EL, and we take the union as n ranges over w.
We simultaneously define an and Sn. We are interested
in U S
nEw n
Sn = M(an). S = M(/) = 0. aO = .
Consider, for each xS n, the <-least yx with (z)
(zEy -> z x).
Consider, for each XESn, PL() - set of all y x with
yeL.
Consider, for each x,yESn, with x y, the <-least
element of x not in y.
Consider, for each XESn, UL(x) = set of all yL such
that (3 z)(zex & yEZ).
Consider, for each TSn, the unique SL satisfying the
semi-relativized of 9) to L. (Call this 9)").
We continue "considering" through 9)", closing Sn in
effect, under the "Skolem functions" for 9)", in such a way
that, as in 7. The System ZF*, we have that the Skolem func-
tions produce values definable in terms of the arguments.
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We take an+l = (union of the O(z)'s for the z's
considered above) + w. Take Sn+ M(an+l).
We can then use appropriate instances of Replacement in
ZF* in combination with the definable well-ordering <, to
show that if the Sn and an are not well-defined for each
n, then there are definable counterexamples to our construction
in the following sense: for some specifically definable sets,
the sets corresponding to them that we considered above do not
exist. But this is impossible by Lemmas 7, 8, 9, and 10. So
our construction is well-defined in ZF*.
Now our model i Sn is an M(a), a definable, a a
new
limit. In particular, it is transitive. It also contains w.
Due to the absoluteness of the definition of L and of the
definition of w in M(a)'s, a a limit, it is easily seen
in ZF*, putting all this together, that the sentences 1)-9)
are true when the quantifiers range over M(a). Furthermore,
since M(a) is definable, the definition of satisfaction and
the induction on a are easily developable in ZF*, in order
to prove, in ZF*, that Con( 1)-9) ).
From the remarks at the beginning of this section, we
immediately have
Theorem 1: F ConZF* -- > ConZF.
ENT
10. ZF. Parameterless ZF, and ZF*. This section is devoted
partially to further consideration of the system ZF* of
Chapter 1, and partially to some other subsystems of ZF.
We define a sentence of set theory to be arithmetical if
it is the relativized of some sentence of set theory to w.
Corollary 1: ZF is a conservative extension of ZF*
for arithmetical sentences.
Proof: Let A be arithmetical, and IZFA. We can show
Con(ZF* + ,A) -> Con(ZF + A) by modifying the proof of
Theorem 1 slightly; Just redefine the systems ZF*I, ZF' as
ZF*' + .A, ZF' + A, respectively. Due to Lemma 6, all of
our Lemmas carry over. Now since ~Con(ZF + .A), we have
Con(ZF* + A), and so zF*A.
Our next Theorem concerns sentences of the form
(x)(3!y)Axy, A arbitrary, with only 2 free variables, that
are provable in ZF*. Now in ZF there are many such sentences
which define, provably, in ZF, a Skolem function which moves
everything and which is 1-1. An example is (x)(3y)(y = IP(x)).
Another is (x)(3y)(y {x}). Not so in ZF*. Thus,
Theorem 2: Let Axy be any formula with only free
variables shown, and let C = (x)(3 1y)(Axy & y x) & (x)(y)(z)
((Axy & Axz) -> y = z). Then C is not provable in ZF*.
Proof: We let C be a sentence of the above form, and
we construct a model for ZF* + XC, given an arbitrary model
for ZF, G\ = <X,R>, where R is a 2-ary relation on X,
X pi . (All models are assumed to be equality models. Note
that ZF* is a first-order theory with equality.)
We define as follows: The domain is to be X U Q,
where Q is the rationals. The 2-ary relation, Sxy, is
defined as Rxy if x,yeX; x < y if x,yEQ; false, if xEQ,
yeX; true if xX, yeQ.
We claim U satisfies ZF* +C.
First, we show that the elements of Q in 3 are
indistinguishable in the sense that if Axl...xnYl...ym holds
in G for xicQ, yjEX, then so does AZl...znyl...y m for
zieQ if the two sequences of rationals, xi, i have the
same order relations in Q, (i.e., there is a 1-1 order
preserving map). To see this, it suffices to show that, given
such a pair of similar sequences of rationals, there is an
automorphism of which keeps the elements of X fixed,
and which maps, in an order-preserving way, the sequence xi
onto zi. And such an automorphism is easily given by any map
which fixes the elements of X and maps the rationals 1-1 onto
itself, which maps the xi into the yj.
Now supposeB j (x)(3,y)(Axy). Then by indistinguish-
ability, it; is clear that for xEQ, we have C Axy for
some yX, for otherwise we would have Axy for x,yEQ, and
hence Axz for z = y + 1. But now I claim that S satisfies
A(x+l,y), since yX, by indistinguishability, assuming xQ.
So 8 does not satisfy C.
Clearly Q3 satisfies axiom 0 of ZF*.
To verify 1 of ZF*, suppose ~ = (x2 )(x2 x0 - x2ex1),
for x2, xl in the domain. Then either xI and xO EX, or
x1 , x0 E Q. In the first case, we can conclude that
a( k (x2 )(x2 EXO - x2 cx1 ), and so since 1= ZF, we have
xO = x1. In the second case, we have 1/2(x0 + x 1) < xO iff
1/2(x0 + x1 ) x1 . But then x0 = x1 .
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To verify 2 of ZF*, set x0 = w of . It is easy to
see that 1d3 = 0 EX0 , since 6 in (3 is same as 0 in f.
Also, x U x) remains unchanged for xeX, when we pass
from al to . Also, the members in a. of x0 are the
same as the members of x in . Also, the subsets in at
of X0, or any of its members, are identical with the corres-
ponding elements in ( . Putting this together, we see that
axiom 2 of ZF* is satisfied in E "in the same way" as it
is in .
To see that 3 of ZF* is satisfied by 4 , suppose
satisfies CA. Then the unique element defined in CA must be
eX, by indistinguishability. We let this element be x. What
we are looking for is a power set of x in the model ( . We
claim that y = P(x) in the model aL does the trick. We
have to show that (2 satisfies y = P(x). But this is
obvious, since the only members of y in are the members
of y in , and the only subsets of x in 3 are the
subsets of x in .
Axiom 4 of ZF* is checked similarly.
To see that axiom 6 of ZF* is satisfied in g , let
xeX U Q. If xeX, take xO in foundation as an R-least
member of x in ® . If xeQ, take x0 to be , in aL (or
2). Obviously I2 j p e x.
Axiom 5 of ZF* is the most complicated. The set that
CA defines in 63 is again e X. Call it D. Then we are
interested in the range in 6 of the partial function in ,
Bx2x1 & (x3 )(Bx2x3 -> x3=x1 ), on the domain D. Now every
X2 with S(x2 ,D) has x2 EX, and so, by indistinguishability,
if S(x2 ,D), and Bx2x & (x3 )(Bx2 x3 -> x3=x1), then x1EX.
Now suppose there is a formula Cx2xl such that, for x2 EX,
x l X , Cx2xl holds in Tl iff Cx2xl holds in . Then by
Replacement in the model 6 , we would have (this instance of)
Replacement in , and we would be done. It remains to show
that for each formula Axl...xn, with the free variables shown,
there is a formula Bx1 ...xn which holds in al iff Ax1 .. . xn
holds in , when xi X.
It suffices to prove by induction that for any formula
AXl...n, and for any partial function f from til<i<n)
into Q, there is a formula Bxil ... xik i k
fill < i < n & i Dom(f)1, such that for any sequence x...x n
with xiEX iff i Dom(f), xi f(i) if iEDom(f), we have
3 A 1...x n iff =Bxil...Xik.
To see this for Axl...x n quantifier-free, take B to
be the formula obtained from A by 1) replacing all instances
of XiExj, iDom(f), JEDom(f), by xi = xi, 2) replacing all
instances of xiExj, or xi=xj, or x =xi, iEDom(f), J Dom(f),
by xjxj, 3) replacing all instances of xi ex j, or xi=xJ,
i,JcDom(f), by (3v)(v=v) if f(i) < f(J), (3v)(v=v) if not;
or (3v)(v=v) if f(i) f(J), (3v)(v=v) if not, respectively.
Put Axl...xn in prenex form, and suppose our claim is
true for all formulae with less quantifiers.
We may assume that Axl
. ..
x n is (xO)CxOxl
..xn,
since the existential case follows from this case by taking
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negations. Let f be a partial function from fill i < n)
into Q. Now 2 finite partial functions g,h from w -> Q
are said to be of the same type if 1) they have the same
domain D, 2) g(x) < g(y) iff h(x) < h(y).
Consider the set of partial functions on filO i < n)
which are identical to f on ill i n. There are only
a finite # of types represented in this set. Pick a repre-
sentative from each type, and call this set ffl,f2,,f. k},
fl = f. Let Di, 1 i k, be the formula given by the
inductive hypothesis for Cx0xl...xn for fi; i.e., each Di
has exactly the free variables x for I Dom(fi),
O .• < n, and for any xO...xn with xeX for lDom(fi),
X = fi (l) for 1eDom(fi), we have (13 CxOxl...xn iff
1 DiXpl. -Xp {PlP q ) = {r o < r n & r Dom(fi )} .
Then we take B to be (xo)D1 & ~ Di. By
indistinguishability, it is easily seen that B and A
satisfies the conclusion of our claim for the function f.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
We now define some new subsystems of ZF. ZFn is to be
the same as ZF except for the Replacement schema. ZF n,
instead, only allows the Axy in the Replacement schema at most
to have n + 2 free variables; x and y and possibly n
other ones. It is easy to see that ZF* is a subsystem of
ZF© . We also have
Corollary 2: ZF* ZF0 .
Proof: Consider the model of ZF* constructed in the
proof of Theorem 2. Consider the sentence A (x)(3y)(0ex
-> (ly & (z)(z0 -> (zEx <-> zy)))). A is obviously
provable in ZFO . But our model of ZF* does not satisfy A.
We believe strongly that ZFO ZF, and in fact in the
stronger conjecture that ZFi Z Fn+ l, for all n. Although
the details of a proof of ZFO ZF have not yet been carried
out, we can give the definition of a very promising model of
ZFO + (3x)(y)(3 z)(--(zy <-- z=x)).
We let M(a) be the minimal model of ZF. We let S be
any Cohen generic set of natural numbers over M(a). We let
MS (a) be the corresponding Cohen model for ZF + V L.
We let FS be the set of all sets of natural numbers
which are finitely different from S (i.e., whose symmetric
difference from S is finite).
Recall that R(I+1) = IP(R(1)), R(X) = U R(1).
Consider the sets xeM S(a) such that for any formula
Ayzx1, we have, in 1MS(a),[zl(3y)(yex & A(x,y,FS))) f xl. We
let X be the set of all such x. We let Y be the set of all
xeX such that any finite combination of union and power set on
x in MS (a) gives a set in X.
For each , let R' () be the unique rank in the cumu-
lative hierarchy up to 5 in the model MS (a).
Define, for each 5, a function f whose domain is
R'(a) n Y, and by the equations f+l(x) {YfyeY & (3z)(zex &
fg (z) y), fX) = U fx y
We define xcZ as [(3B3)(<a d x Range(fg )) & xEY].
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We conjecture that <Z,e> is the desired model.
We feel that a detailed analysis of the relations between
the theories Z n, hopefully by finding natural sentences to
distinguish each ZFn from ZFn+ , would involve non-trivial
applications of the notion of forcing. In particular, careful
attention seems to be required as to the model-theoretic
properties of models of theories obtained by forcing; e.g.,
the definability or indistinguishability of various elements
of the models constructed.
CHAPTER II
1. Definitions of Systems. We will have for our language,
number variables, n,m,p,q,r; set variables, x,y,z,w,u,v,...;
the relation nex between numbers and sets; and the constant
number "O" which can hold only between variables of the same
type.
We introduce function variables in the usual way by
defining them in terms of sets of natural numbers in the usual
way. We will have full number theory at our disposal, since
all systems considered here will have the unrestricted induct-
ion axiom schema (called I) [AO & (n)(An -> An')] --> (n)An,
where A is any formula with possibly free variables of both
kinds, and can have both number and set quantification.
Also, all systems considered here will have the axiom of
extensionality (that any two sets with the same members are
equal), and we will tacitly assume that the system we will call
I includes this axiom. Thus I will be the unrestricted
axiom schema of induction plus the axiom of extensionality.
In addition, all systems considered will have the recurs-
ively enumerable comprehension axiom schema (called ReCA),
(x1). .. (xl)(e)(3y)(n)(ney - (3k)T-e,n,k,xl, .. , 1) ).
The predicates Ti are understood to be written out in
the usual way with bounded quantifiers. (Or, we may have
instead introduced them as primitive, and defined them by
adding axioms of primitive recursion.) The predicates TA
above are what Kleene wouldca lT ,f where 
above are what Kleene would call T , where fi is
the characteristic function for the set, xi. See Kleene [3],
p. 291.
Before we get into the mathematics of the systems we will
be considering, we will state, informally, some propositions
concerning what can be done in the system I + ReCA.
Proposition 1: We can, in I + ReCA, Justify all uses of
coding normally found in the development of hierarchy theory.
Thus, we may Justify the use of such symbols as x,y> and
(X)n (respectively (2n + l * 3 m+llnex & mey], and {mlpm+lex],
where pn is the nth prime).
We define the relation between functions and sets alluded
to above, as f(n) = m iff n,m> f, where n,m> =
2 n+l 3m+l.
Proposition 2: In ReCA + I, we may provably perform
"collapse of like quantifiers". In other words, the usual way
of collapsing 2 successive universal set quantifiers (or function
quantifiers) into one can be completely Justified on the basis
of ReCA + I.
Def. 1: A predicate A(n,xl,
. .
., x p ) of n is said to be
essentially 1TI if it is in prenex form followed by a matrix
T(e,n,m,xl,...,P,fl,...,f ,nl,...,nk), where there are no set
quantifiers in A, and the fi occur as universal function
quantifiers, in any order, mixed together with possibly number
quantifiers (ni) and (3 nj) and (3m). (No existential
function quantifiers in A.) An essentially 4 formula is
Just the prenex form of the negation of an essentially T11
5o
formula.
Proposition 3: For every arithmetical predicate (with
parameters) there is a predicate (f)(3 m)T(e,n,m,xl,...,x2,
nl,
. . .
,n p ) which is, provably in I + ReCA, equivalent.
There is also a predicate (3f)(m),T(i,n,m,xl...,x,·nl,...,np )
which is, provably in I + ReCA, equivalent.
Proposition 4: Define (x) ( ) as the -th Jump of x.
y = (x)( ) - 3 a sequence (x0 ,...,x,) such that x = x and
xi+l = Jump of xi. (Thus, y (x)(1) is a predicate of 3
variables, defined in the usual way.) Then in I + ReCA we
may prove (3!y)(u = (x)()).
This is proved by induction on 2.
Consider
L) (x)(p)(e) (n) (f ) (3m)T2(e,n,m,f,x) (3g)(r)~-T2(p,n,r,g,x)
-- > (3y)(n)(ney (f)(3m)T2(e,n,m,f ,x))}.
2) The schema, (x)((n)[Anx Bnx] -> (3y)(n)(ny- Anx)},
where A is essentially 1, B is essentially I1
3) (x)(e)((n)( 3 f)(m)-T 2 l(e,O,m,n,f,x) -> (3 y)(n)(y)n is a
function & (m)~T2 1 (e,0O,m,n,y,x ) ) )
4) (x)((n)(3 f)A(n,f,x) -> (3y)(n)((Yn) is a function &
A(n,yn,x))), where A is essentially Z1.
5) (x)(e)((f)(3 g)(m)T 3 (e,0,m,f,g,x) -> (f)(3 y)(n)(yo = f &
(m)-T3(e,,m,yn yn+l ,x) ) ).
6) (x)((f)(3g)A(f,g,x) -> (f)(3y)(n)(yo = f & A(Yn·Yn+lX)))
where A is essentially 21 having only the free variables
f,g,x.
We call I + ReCA + 1), the pure A; I + ReCA + 2),We call I + ReCA + 1), the pure A1-CA; I + ReCA + 2),
I
I
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essentially A-CA; I + ReCA + 3), pure E1-AC; I + ReCA + 4),
essentially 41-AC; I + ReCA + 5), pure :1-DC; I + ReCA + 6),
essentially 2 -DC.
NOTE: "CA" is supposed to mean "comprehension axiom"; "AC",
axiom of choice; "DC", dependent choices.
Proposition 5: In pure 21-AC, for every essentially 11
predicate, there is a pure 1 predicate (f)(3n)T(,m,n,...)
which is provably equivalent.
To see this, first use Proposition 2 to collapse adjacent
like quantifiers. Then use pure £1-AC to interchange a
number and function quantifier, and then use Proposition 2 and
then pure Z1-AC, etc.
Proposition 6: Pure 21-AC D pure 1-CA.
The idea is that, in pure Al-CA, one has that for each
m there is a solution to one of two n1 predicates, and one
uses pure Z1-AC to form a Skolem function. Then the required
set in pure A1-CA is obtained, in pure Z1-AC, recursively
in the ump of the Skolem function.
Proposition 7: Pure £1-AC = essentially £1-AC.
By Proposition 5, one has only to consider the case
(n)(3f)(3g)(m)fT--> 3 Skolem function. But we may collapse
the f and g quantifiers in the usual way, and apply pure
1£1-AC to get a Skolem function, which will have recursive in
it the Skolem function wanted in the implication above.
A similar argument shows
Proposition 8: Pure 2 1-AC D essentially i-CA.
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Conjecture: We do not know whether pure 4-CA -
essentially A-CA, or whether pure A-CA = Z-AC, or whether
Z1-AC - essentially AI-CA, and we conjecture that none of the
three statements is correct.
Proposition 9: Pure 21-DC -> 2Z-AC. (By Prop. 5, we
call essentially 1_AC, and pure 2:-AC, just 1-AC.)
Hence also
Proposition 10: Essentially £1-DC - pure 1-DC.
Proposition 11: We can prove in ReCA + I the recursion
theorem (with parameters).
2. Preliminary Letmmas. We will eventually show that Z1-DC is
a conservative extension for purely 21 sentences of pure hi-CA.
We define, in I + ReCA, several notions.
Def. 1: P(n,m) is defined as the CGdel number (in the usual 1-1
onto G8del numbering of pairs of natural numbers) of the pair
<n,m>.
Def. 2: epX is defined in the usual way as the nth partial re-
cursive function in x. Note that in I + ReCA we can prove
(n)(x)(3 c) 
Def. 3: RLOX(n) is defined as "Range (cpX) C {0,l' & (m)
(meDom(ep )) & Cpx defines a linear ordering," where o defines a
linear ordering means that 1) (m)(cpX(P(m,m)) = 0), 2) (p)(q)(r)
(Cppx(P(p,q)) . 1 & PX(P(q,r)) - 1) -> ,x (P(p,r)) - 1)).
3) (p)(q)(qnx(P(p,q)) - 1 -> cpX(P(q,p)) - 0. 4) (p)(q)(p = q v
Xcp(P(p,q)) = 1 v cp(P(q,p)) = 1). We define RLO(n) =- RLO0(n).
Def. 4: We define
define p < q = RLOX(n) &
n
x = , we use the subscript
< q = RLOX(n) & n(P(p,q))
n
1.
(cpn(P(pq)) 1 v p = q).
n instead of n .
the empty set.)
We define WX(n) as RLOX(n) & (y)(3m)(y= v
(r) (rey ->
= RLOX(n) & q < p
n
& (r)(r < xP -> r xq
n n
Suc x(p) = (3 q)Suc n(p,q). Lim x( ) = RLOX(n) & (3q)(q <
o nx(P) - RLOX(n) &
n
n (Z) 
n
RLO(nX) &
(q)(p 
((Z)p)(l) =(p) (m) (Suc nx (m,)
n
= (P(r,s) s < xP
n
& re(z)s ) &
(p)(o (P) ->
n
(x)p Y= ). Thus H x(Z)
n
is the predicate of
4 variables asserting that z is a hierarchy on the RLO, n,
starting from ye It will be useful later on to include the
condition
Def. 8: 
(k) (kez -> (3p) (kE(z)p)),
is the predicate ofHYx( )
"I
z is a hierarchy on the RLO, nx
in the definition above.
5 variables asserting that
uR to but not including I
starting from
Def. 9: x y
usual way.
y. Thus if
is defined as
then (z)p= 0.p x,
n
"x is recursive in y"
Def. 10: Inx < ImXI
proper imbedding of
means RLOX (n) & RLOx (m ) &
xn into mX, i.e.,
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We
When
denotes
m < xr))).
n
Def. 6: Suc (pq )
n
(mey &
.SUx (p))-
n
De . 7: HY
)·
(z) m) &
xP &
n
(x)p(p) (lim x(P) ->
n
in the
is a
(p) (q) { (p < -- >nxq 
f(p) xf(q)) &
m
InX
In X I
= ImXI
< ImxI
Def. 11:
([p<xq & q
m
E Range (f)] -> p
means that the range of the
= InXl
HypX (y)
= mXI v In X
E Range (f))1.
f above is
< ImX .
(3n)(3z)(RLOX(n) & (HX (z)) &
y TZ)
Lemma 1:
provable in
(x)(y)(z)([WZ(n) &
I + ReCA. Also, [W'
HZ (x) &
n
HZ
zn
Z(n) & HZ_(x)
np
(y)] -> y=x)
& HZz (y)] -
np
y = x is also provable.
Given n,x,y,z with WZ(n), HZz(y).
n
in I + ReCA. By WX (n), we have a < -least
n
q. Clearly we must not have
(X)sxq ->
n
0 x(q).
n
= (Y)s),
If lim x(q),
n
we have (X)q
If Suc x(qs),
n
then since
()q = (Y)q.
Lemma 2:
wZ(n) & wZ(m) &
three holds:
The following is provable
a)
in pure ifA1-CA:
then exactly one of the following
there is a unique imbedding of the ordering
initial segment of the ordering
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W.
is
Proof: Form
element
then, since (s)(s <
(Y)q (X)S = (Y)S we have
(P I W p74 (Y)P
(3x) (4)).*
z
m andnz onto a proper
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there is no imbedding of the ording mZ onto an initial seg-
ment of the ordering n z .
b) there is a unique imbedding of the ordering nz onto the
whole ordering m, and vice versa, and there are no imbeddings
onto proper initial segments in either direction.
c) the interchanging of n with m in a).
Furthermore, denote x(1) for the result of applying 
iterations of the Jump operator to x, e w. Then all the
above maps may be found •fx ( .) for some I depending on n
and m.
Proof: In a), if there is an imbedding, f, of n onto
a proper initial segment of m then it must be unique, since
if g is another, form, in I + ReCA, (klf(k) g(k)), and
take an n-least member, p. Running through the 3 cases,
O (p), Suc z(p) and lim z(p) in a straightforward way,
n n n
using the linearity of n and m, we get a contradiction.
Same with c).
If there is an imbedding, g, of m onto an initial
-1 -l
segment of n, take g 1, and note that g 1 must disagree
with f somewhere. Then follow the procedure above.
If there is an imbedding of n onto the whole ordering m,
then there is one from m to n by taking inverse. (Note
that we can form inverses by ReCA.) And there are no proper
imbeddings, using least counterexample argument above.
So the main thing is the existence of these imbeddings.
We define a function f z(p) greatest k such that
56
(3q)(Suck z(p,q)), where Suck is k iterations of Suc.
(This is well defined, since (p)(q)(r)(Suc z(p,r) & Suc z(p,q)]
n n
-> r = q)). There is always a greatest k, since otherwise
we would have an arithmetically defined chain through nz, and
finitely many iterations of ReCA (+ I) would realize this claim
as an object, and would contradict WZ(n).
Fix n,m, with WZ(n), WZ(m), (x) (Zz (x)). Let f (p) be
n n
abbreviated f(p). We claim that, for each p, either there is
an imbedding of the ordering m onto an initial segment S of
the ordering n, so that keS---> k < p, or there is an
n
imbedding of kJk < zp) of n, onto an initial segment of m,
and these imbeddings are to be found < T(x)p(l(f(P)+l)).
(This is the result of applying 10(f(p)+l) iterations of the
Jump operator to (x)p.)
We assume this is false,and, as usual, form plclaim is
false}. We take an n-least member, q If 0 (q), then
clearly claim is true for q. If Suc (q,r), then certainly
f(r) + 1 = f(q). So there exists a comparison mapping,
< T()r(lO(f(r)+l)), between the segment of n up to r, and
m. It is then easy to see that there is a (unique) comparison
map between the segment of n up to q, and m, IT(x(lO(f(r)+l))
The limit case is similarly easy; the uniqueness of these compar-
ison maps is used heavily, and that the property of being a
comparison map is low arithmetical, and that the function f
is low arithmetical.
Lemma : The following is provable in I + ReCA: If
WY(n) az
(3z) (z <
in n,
nd WY (m),
T(x)p
and InY I
(o (f(f)+l)) &
of the range of the
< lmy I, an
HY (z)), wh
mY
imbedding of
thend (3x) (HY (x)),
nY
ere p is the l.u.b.
in n, and f
defined in the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.
that if H y
np
Lemma 4:
One notes,
has a solution, it must be unique.
If m < InZI, and p is the l.u.b.
of the image of the imbedding,
& y < T () (l(f(P)+l))),(3x) (H z (x)
np
is provable
where f is f z
n
in I + ReCA.
Proof: One can prove first, as in Lemma 2,
(3x) (H (x)).
with HZZ (x),
np
course,
Then, again like Le
one can prove that
it is provable in ReCA + 
(3!x) HZ (x)).)
np
Def. 12:
(3q) Suck
(q,P) ->
Reas (nx
x(P,q) &
n.
) RLOX (n) &
lim (q) ) &
n
(q)(q < xp )].
(p)
(3r
(Reas (n)
mna 2, starting with this
y < T(x)(lO(f()+l)) (0:
[ that (3x)(HZz(x) ->
np
(Onx (P) v Lim x(p) v (3k)
-) (O (r)) &C (P ) (3q) (Suc
reads "n is reasonable.")
Lemma 5:(z)(n)(x)(y)(m)([Reas(mZ) & Hzz
n
(x) & HZz(y) &
m
(3p)(x < T ( y ) p & there are infinitely many q >mzp)),
is provable in I + ReCA.
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is f y
e.g.,
and (3y)(HZz(y)),
m
in nZ
then
This
that
x
WZ (m) ->
Proof: Assume Reas(mz), ffZ
n
there is a set, w, which has no
(x), H z (y), WZ (m). Then
zleast member
mZ-least member. It is
then easy to see, using I + ReCA, that (3g)(k)(g(k+l) ( g(k)).
n
We will show that (p ) (k)((x )p T (Y)g (k~ BY Reas(mZ), this
is sufficient.
For, we take, in I + ReCA, pl(3k)(~((x)p < T(Y)g(k)))•.
We can do this, since the predicate we are taking the extension
of is arithmetical in x,y. And we take an n-least such p,
call it q, by WZ(n). We then obtain a contradiction.
1) 0 z (q). To get a contradiction for this case, it suffices
to show that (k)(z T(Y)g(k)) If lim z(g(k)), then
clearly z T( Y )g (k ) ' If 0m (g(k)), also easy. If
Suc (g(k)), then by Reas(mz), we have Sucrz(g(k),s), some
r,s with lim(s), and so z T(Y)s So clearly (Y)g(k)
() s(r) and so80 z T()g(k)
2) Suc (q,r). Then (X)r < T ( )g (k)' all k. But then
(x)(l) T(Y)g(k1), all k > 0, and hence (X)q T(y)g(k),
all k for the following general reason: if p < zq, then
(y)(l) K T(Y)q The case when lime (q) is easy. When
Sucz ( q ) , use Reas(mz) as in Case 1) above.
m
3) lim (q). Let k be arbitrary. We know () ( < zq
> (X)1 T(Y)g(k+10) ) - Furthermore, the question of whether
a set is (x)1 , is a question low arithmetical in , due to
the uniqueness of Hierarchies on RLO's, and even hierarchies
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on initial segments of RLO's. Hence (x)q is low arithmetical
in (Y)g(k+lO)' and hence (x)q will re recursive in
g(k+l10)' Hence, by reasonableness of mZ, we have
(,X)q < T(Y)g(k).
Lemma 6: "The predicate WX(n) is not E1 in x" is
provable in I + ReCA.
Proof: We have, in ReCA + I, the Kleene normal form
for predicates I 1 in x, and we use that to formalize the
Lemma. So assume A) (n)(WX(n) (3f)(m)4T(e,n,m,f,x)). Now
there is an explicit recursive function g, for which we can
prove in ReCA + I, that B) (k)(n)E(f)(3m)T(k,n,m,f,x) -
WX(g(k,n))]. Hence 3 such that (n)(f)(3m)T(n,O,m,f,x) -
(3 f)(m)~'.T(e,n,f,x)), is provable in I + ReCA, since the
predicate (f)(3m)T(m,O,m,f,x) of n is 1 in x, by A)
and B), and Kleene's normal form Theorem is provable. Now
substitute e for n to get a contradiction.
3. Conservative Extension Result.
Theorem 1: Given any model M of pure A1-CA + S, where
S is any purely k sentence, there exists a model M' of
E1 -DC + S where S is (3 y)(g)(3n)T(g,O,n,y,z), for some e.
Proof: A model of pure A1-CA + S consists of an inter-
pretation J of the natural numbers, and +,x,O,, together
with a set of objects, X, and a binary relation R(j,x), JEJ,
XEX. We define a new model HypY(M) = M', as 1) having same
J,+,x,O,'; 2) having same R(J,x) but restricted to those
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JEJ, xX with M Hyp(x). Now since M S, choose y such
that M (g)(3n)T(i,O,n,y,g). Then clearly M' (g)(3n)T
(e,O,n,y,g). So Mt S.
We claim M' = E1-DC. It is sufficient to show that the
relativized of each axiom of X-1DC to the predicate Hyp is
a theorem of pure A1-CA. (We define the relativized, T(A),
of a formula A, to the predicate HypY(x) by T(A v B) =
T(A) v T(B), T(A & B) = T(A) & T(B), T(A) -= T(A), T(3xA) =
(3 x)(T(A) & ypY(x)), T((x)A) = (x)(HypY(x) -> T(A)), T(Q) =
Q, Q quantifier free, T(3nA) = (3n)T(A), T((n)A) = (n)(T(A))).
In other words, the universal closure, obtained by inserting
the universal quantifier (y), of the relativized of each
axiom of -1_DC to HypY is a Theorem of pure A1-CA.
1) Induction. It is clear that the relativized of each
instance of induction to HypY is again an instance of induct-
ion, and so is provable in pure l1-CA.
2) ReCA. To prove the relativized of ReCA, it suffices
to prove, in pure A1-CA, that (x)(HypY (x) -> Hypy (x (l ) ) ) .
To see this, let Hy (z), W Y(n), x < T So x() < T(1)
If ny has a greatest element, i, set k = f y(i) + 2. If
not, set k = 2. Define a new ordering mx by adding on the
first 10'k integers on top of n, and make,in the trivial
way, the ordering my total, so that RLOY(m) and Iny l <
Imy l . Now clearly by Lemma 4, (3w)(Hmy (w)), and so clearly
(3w)(HY y(w)), by I + ReCA. But, also by Lemma 4, z(1)
m
< Tw . Hence HypY(z(l)).
3) Suppose (f)(HpY(f) -> (3g)(HypY(g) & (m)~T3
(e,O,m,f,g,x))), where HypY(x). Let HypY(f). We consider
the predicate Pn n is a member of a finite sequence
n O n l . . . ,n k k 2 0, such that I) (i)WY(ni). II) For any
sequence of sets xO,xl,...,x j , J k, such that (i)(HY (xi )) ,
nyi
we have that 3 another sequence zi such that each zirx i ,
and z0 = f and (i < J)(m)T 3 (e,O,m,z i+ 1,X). III) For any
sequence xo,xl,...,x, J < k, with (i < J)(RHY(xi)), it is
not the case that (3z)(3p)[Hy (z) & p has infinitely
(nj+1 )pmany q > Zi ~~ T~~i, ¶1+1• TZ-
many q > y p & 3Zozl,S, z jz j+ l i TXi' Zj+1 TZ'
n.+1
with (s < )(m)T3(eO ,m,ZsZs+l,1x)].
Also consider Qn n is a member of a finite sequence
n O , . . . , n , k O, Reas(ny ), such that 3 sequence of sets
xOXl,...,Xk with I) (i)HYy(xi). II) 3 a sequence zi such
that each zi < Txi and zo = f and (i)(m)-T3 (e,O,m,zi,zi+1 ,x
III) Let -1 • j < k. It is not the case that (3z)(3p)
Et • TXJ+l & HY (z) & p has infinitely many q >
(n3 , )y
& 3 ,Zl,...,zj,Zj+l, i _ TXi' ZJ+1 TZ' with (S < )(m)
~,T3 (e ,O,m,zs,zs+1 ,x)].
We first note that Pn is a TI predicate in f,x,y and
that Qn is a 2 1 predicate in f,x,y.
We wish to show, in I + ReCA, that (n)(Pn - Qn).
) ·
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Suppose Pn. Assume that nO,nl,...,nk have the
properties mentioned in the definition of Pn. We claim that
(i)(3 xi)HYy (xi). For, if for some i, '(3xi)HYy (xi), then
take i to be least such (induction), and then by (i)WY(ni)
we have that (q)([WY(q) & (3 z)(Hy (z))] -> qY < InYl),
qY i
and, in fact, qY is imbedded into ny with 1.u.b. having
infinitely many points p > yS. Hence the z with Hy (z)
niy
must be • T some w with H y (w), where r has infin-
itely many points s > yr. We claim that this violates
ni
condition III) of Pn when J = i-l. (We allow J to be
negative.) For Just apply condition 2) of Pn, and that
(f)(3g)(m)-uT relativized to HypY , and that Hypy (f). In
condition II) of Pn, use that (s)(s < i -> (3 xi)HY(xi)),
n½
and use the x i.
So we want to show Qn, and we may choose XO,xl,...,xk
with HYy(xi). II) in Qn follows from 2) in the definition
i
of Pn. III) in Qn follows from III) in Pn plus the
observation that the predicates HY have unique solutions
(n p
< T in (X)p.
So Pn -- > Qn.
Suppose Qn. We first to show (i)WY(ni). Using Lemma 5,
and taking i least with WY (ni), we contradict III) of Qn
in the same way as the argument above for Pn -> Qn. For,
one uses II) of Qn, and the relativization of (f)(3g)(m)~T.
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So (i)WY(ni).
Now II) of Pn follows from II) of Qn by uniqueness
of hierarchies on n i because of WY(ni).
III) of Pn follows from III) of Qn for the same reason.
Next, we show that we can eliminate the parameters f and
x in Pn and Qn, and have the same meaning and still be,
respectively, 1 and E1. For, since Hypy (x ) and Hypy ( f ) ,
let el, e2 have WY(el) and WY(e2 ) & (3z)(HYy(z) & x TZ
e1
with Gdel number k) & (3w)(HYy(w) & f T with G8del
2
number 1). Then take P'n to be (x)(f)(w)(z)(HYy(z) &
HY (w) & x < T with Gdel number k & f Tw with G'del
ey
number 1 -> P(n,f,x)). Take Q'n to be (3x)(3f)(3w)(3z)
(Q(n,x,f) & Hy (w) & x Tz with Gcdel number k & f T
with Gdel number ). Here, el,e2, k, and 2 are constants,
not variables.
Now, Q'n is 1 . Also, (n)('n-> WY(n)), since
Q'n - P'n. So define Rm - (3n)(Q'n & ImYl InYl). So
clearly (m)(Rm -> WY (x)), and R is l. So by Lemma 6,
(3p)(WY(p) & Rp). Fix such a p. So WY(p) & (n)(Q'n ->
InYlJ IpYl). We wish to form [<r,s>lQ's & Isl ithe segment
of pY up to r ). We can, using pure A -CA, since this is
also equivalent to [<r,s>P's & ~.(the segment of pY up to
rj<jls)1, form this (these) set(s). Call this set S. Let
T = rl(Bs)(<r,s> e S!. By W Y(p), let pO be the < y-least
py
upper bound of this set. Let q have WV(q), with q the
segment of pY up to and including po1. If there is no upper
bound for T, take q = p. In any case, clearly (n)(Q'n ->
Inyl < qY|). Also, clearly ()(3n)(Q'n -> InYl 2 the seg-
ment of q up to I1). Hence, clearly (j)(3 z)(Ky(z)).
We wish to show (3w)(Hy (w)). The only hard case is when
q
qY has no greatest point. But we can form, in pure A1-CA,
{<,J>l(3z)(Hq (z) & Jez)), since it, besides this I 1 defin-
ition, has the 1 definition (<,J>j(z)(H (z) -> jez)),1 I
and we may, arithmetically in this set, get a w with Hy (w).
qy
Finally, we claim that the sequence (not necessarily
unique) needed to verify the relativized z1-DC to Hypy, can
be defined arithmetically in w with HYy (W), and hence would
qY
have what we wanted all along, namely satisfying HypY . To see
this, it suffices to show that any finite sequence n,...,nk
satisfying the conditions in the definition of Pn can be
extended to nl,nl,...,nk+l, satisfying Pn, and also that
there are sequences satisfying the definition of Pn to begin
with. To see the latter, let f < Tz with H Yy(z), W(e).
Take (k|f a(Z)k, nd let k be a l.u.b. Take s with
ISYI = Ithe segment of ey up to k with an appropriate
finite number of points added on top so as to make, by the
Lemmas, (3w)(H y(w) & z Tw ) . If there is no l.u.b., take
s = e. Take nO = s. Then the sequence <no> satisfies the
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the definition of Pn. The same trick allows one to see how to
extend a sequence nO, n , .l' .*, n k satisfying Pn to an
n O n l .. , n k n k + l satisfying Pn, for one uses the fact that
(f)(3g)(m)~T relativizes, and use that <nO,nl,...,nk> satis-
fies (the definition of) Qn.
4. Independence Result. We wish to show here that 21-DC is
independent of 2-AC. It suffices to show that 1i-AC I £-DC.
We do this by showing that, for a suitably chosen sentence S
with Con(S + -DC), we can prove in S + 4i-DC that
Con(S + 2:-AC). For then, if 1-DC then S + DC
proves Con(S + -DC), and hence by Gdel's theorem,
S + 1-_DC would be inconsistent.
Lemma 1: If S is any sentence in prenex form starting
with universal number and set quantifiers from left, followed
by existential number and set quantifiers, followed by a matrix
containing only number quantifiers, then Pr(X1-DC + S a
(coding into natural numbers) w-model satisfying S").
Proof: Collapse all the universal number quantifiers in
the left part of S, and collapse all the existential number
quantifiers on the right part of S (before the matrix) so
that S becomes S' = (n)(x)( 3 m)(3 y)A(n,x,m,y). Then push
(3m) into the matrix, to get (n)(x)(3y)B(n,x,y).
Now in set theory, given two w-models ML and , we
can talk of ( being a closure of at under the sentence
(z)(3w)C(z,w), i.e., L C 3 and (z)(z Dom(fl) -> (3w)
(w Dom(4B) & C(z,w))).
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Instead of talking of real w-models, talk of codings of
them into a set of natural numbers in a natural (arithmetical)
way. Then we can prove in 2z-DC + S that for any n and for
any finite -model, 3 a finite closure of this w-model under
the n sentences (x)(3y)B(,x,y), k < n. This depends
heavily on that (n)(x)(3y)B(n,x,y) is provable in £1-DC + S.
Now, consider the arithmetical predicate D(z,w) = "z is
a (coding of) pair (k,x), w is a (coding of) pair (k+l,y)
where y is a (coding of) finite w-model which is a closure of
the (coding of) finite w-model x under the k sentences
(x)(3y)B(,x,y), p < k+l." ow applying Z1-DC to this predi-
cate D, we obtain a sequence of dependent choices in which
the desired w-model of S can be obtained recursively.
Now suppose we found a true sentence S in the form for
Lemma 1, such that I + S proves £1-AC. Then we would be
done, since I + S would be provably consistent in ZI-DC + S
(remember all w-models provably satisfy I) and i1-DC + S is
consistent, since S is true.
By well-known techniques, ReCA is finitely axiomatizable,
since we need only consider the case of two parameters. We
take S to be the conjunction of this finite axiomatization
with the sentence (x)(n)(Wx(n) -> (3y)(X (y))). Then S is
clearly of the proper form.
We define (W*)X(n) = RLOX(n) & (y)(HypX (y) -> 3 an
nX-least element of y, provided y r 0).
We know that S + I ReCA + I, so we can use Lemmas of
the previous chapter about provability in ReCA + I.
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Lemma 2: The following is provable in S + I: for every
n with WX(n), there is a coding of a function f:w -> P(w)
such that whenever (W*)X(m) & ~WX(m ), we have f(m) is an
imbedding of nx onto an initial segment of mX.
Proof: We can prove, like Lemma 2 of the previous section,
in I + ReCA, that if (W*)X(n) & (3z)(Hxx(z)), then the
conclusion of the Lemma is true. But S guarantees that
(3z)(Hxx(z)) ust on the basis of WX(n).
n
Now suppose (n)(3f)(m)4T(e,O,m,f,n,x). The predicate of
p, (3z)I x(z)) & ReasX(p) is £1, and so, since every p
with WX(p) satisfies it, 3 k such that (3z)(HxX(z)) &
Reasx(k) & Wx (k.). Then by Lemma 5, (z)(Hx',(z) -> Hyp (z)).
Clearly we have (n)( 3f)( 3z)[l x (z) & (m)"hT(e,O,m,f,n,x)3 .
Collapsing the quantifiers in the usual way, and putting the
result in Kleene Normal Form, we end up with (n) (3h)(m)
~T(q,O,h,n,x). Furthermore, any Skolem function for this
sentence would have, recursive in it, a Skolem function for
(n)(3 f)(m)'T(e,O,m,f,n,x). So it remains to show, in S + I,
that (n)(3h)(m)~T(q,O,m,h,n,x) has a Skolem function.
Now,there is a standard recursive function F such that
(n)(RLOX(F(n)) & any set for which there is no F(n)X-least
element, has recursive in it a solution h to (m)~.T(q,O,m,h,n,x)
& any solution h has recursive in it a set for which there
is no F(n)X-least element). So (n)((W*)X(F(n)) & ~wX(F(n))).
Now consider the El-predicate Pk = RLOX(k) & (3f)(n)(f
a coding of a function from w into P(w) such that f(n) is
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an imbedding of kx into F(n)X). By Lemma 2 of this section,
this 1 predicate holds of all k with WX(k), and so holds
for some r with WX(r), by Lemma 6. Then we have a function
f such that for each n, f(n) is an imbedding of rx into
F(n)X . Let X be any non-empty set for which there is no
rX-least member. Then recursively in X, f, we can find a
coding g of a function ---> P(w), such that, for each n,
g(n) is a non-empty set for which there is no F(n)X-least
element. Hence, by the special property of the recursive
function F, we may obtain the desired Skolem function for
(n)(3h)(m)T(q,O,m,h,n,x) recursively in g.
Thus we have verified that I + S proves E1-AC, and we
immediately have
Theorem 2: 1i'-DC is independent of £1-AC.
5. Relation Between Predicative and Ivyperarithmetic Analysis.
£1-A C (or i-CA or E1-DC) are considered reasonable
formulations of so-called hyperarithmetic analysis, in view of
the fact that they are natural systems whose minimum w-model
consists of exactly the hyperarithmetic sets of natural numbers.
In this section we compare 1-AC with a system T which
represents the formalization of a small part of predicative
analysis (see Feferman, E ).
The system T is I + ReCA + the infinite list of axioms
(y)(3x)( (x)), where n varies, and k is fixed, and k
is the Gdel number of a natural well-ordering of type cO.
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(Thus the infinite list of sentences is obtained by changing n).
We will show that £1-AC is a conservative extension of
T with respect to all purely N2 sentences.
(ReCA is formalized as one sentence, in the standard way,
i.e., using only 2 parameters xO x1 .)
It is easily seen by well-known techniques that the proof
of conservative extension can be made finitary. So we obtain a
finitary proof of Con(ZE1-AC) relative to Con(T). Finitary
generally means here, in PRA (primitive recursive arithmetic).
A widely used index of complexity of an axiomatic theory
is how large is the least upper bound of its provable ordinals.
In the present context, an ordinal a is said to be a provable
ordinal of a given fixed theory, if there is an n with RLO(n)
and n has order type a and the theory proves W(n). In
view of the conservative extension for T1 that we will prove,
it is clear that the provable ordinals of 1-AC are exactly
the provable ordinals of T.
It follows from work of Feferman [l) and Tait 5] that the
least upper bound on the provable ordinals of T is the ordinal
represented by the so-th critical function at 0. (See Feferman
l], pp. 14-16). Furthermore, it also follows from their work
that in PRA + rule of primitive recursive induction on the
natural RLO corresponding to the £0-th critical function at O,
a consistency proof may be given for T. So, by our results,
such a consistency proof may be given for 1-AC.
By an instance of induction on kn we mean a statement of
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the form [A(q) & (p)(tp < n & (m)(m< p -> Am)] -> Ap)P
> (p)(p < i n-> Ap), where q has Ok(q), and A is any
formula (in the language of Analysis, described at the begin-
ning of this chapter), with possibly free variables, and A is
in prenex form.
By the complexity of a formula in prenex form, we will
mean here the total number of quantifiers occurring. Let
Comp(A) be the complexity of A.
For each integer m, there is a natural predicate T_(n)
on GCdel numbers of formulae of complexity n, such that
T_(n) says that the formula with GCdel number n is true.
m
The formalization of these truth predicates involve placing
formulae in a weak Kleene normal form (i.e., no attention is
paid to the form of the quantifiers, but only that the matrix
be the T-predicate of the appropriate variables).
By the reflection principle, for a theory S, (of this
language) of complexity m, we mean the single sentence
(n)([n Gdel number of a sentence of complexity (i &
Pr(S,n)] -> T_(n)). We call this Rm (s).
m
We need some facts from proof theory which follow from
work of Tait (see [5]), Feferman (see [1], p. 23) and Kreisel
(see [43 ).
Fact 1: 3 primitive recursive functions F, G, and H such
that the following are provable in PRA:
1) For each m,n > O, F(m,n) gives the Gdel number of
an instance of induction on kG(n) applied to a formula of
complexity < H(m), with no parameters.
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2) For each m,n we have that Rm(In) is provable in
the theory In + the formula represented by F(m,n). In is
defined as the subsystem of I consisting of induction
applied only to formulae of complexity < n.
Let J be the sentence "for every purely Y1 predicate
Pn (possibly with parameters), (32)(q)((q < _- > Pq) &
k
(2 = p v( < _p & (r)(r > -> -Pr))))." We let T' = T +
k k
the infinite list Jp.
In the theory T, the axioms (y)(3x)H (x), as n
kn
varies, have bounded complexity. Choose c' such that the
conjunction of any sentence (y)(3x)(HY (x)) with ReCA and
kn
any purely Z sentence and any Jp, has complexity < c!,
some fixed constant c'. We are interested in Fact 1, when
m = c'. We let c = H(c'). We define new theories TP = In +
(y)(3x)Hy (x) + ReCA + J. Applying Fact 1 for m = c
kp P
we get
Fact 2: 3 primitive recursive functions F and G such that
the following are provable in PRA:
1) For each n > 0, F(n) gives the Gdel number of an
instance of induction on kG(n) applied to a formula with no
parameters of complexity < c.
2) For each n > O, we have that Rc,(In) is provable
in the theory In + the formula represented by F(n).
Now, since Comp(A) = Comp(-A), we see that Rc,(In)
formally implies Con(TP + B) within TP + B, where p is anyn n
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integer, and B is any purely 4 sentence. So hence the
formula represented by F(n) must not be provable in T + B
if TP + B is consistent, by Gdel's Theorem. This is so, no
matter what n and p are.
hew n
Pew
Fact : 3 primitive recursive functions F, G, such that, in
PRA, under the assumption Con(T + B), B some fixed 4
sentence, we can derive, for some constant c,
(n)(p)Con(T + B + .(the sentence "F(n)")) & (n)(F(n) rep-
resents an instance of induction on kG(n) applied to a
formula with no parameters of complexity • c).
Lemma : From Con(T' + B) we can conclude, by finitary
means, that Con(Zl-AC + B).
Proof: It suffices to show (n)Con (z1-AC with only
induction In + B).
For each n, we get a model for "B + 1-AC with only I"
by applying the inner model technique to the theory
TG(nc3) + B + .(the sentence "F(n+c ) " ).
n+c3
Now F(n+c3) represents a certain instance of induction
on k , and let this induction be applied to Qs, no
G(n+c3 )
parameters. Now B says (3f)(f satisfies some specific 1
property); we fix such an f. Then we wish to show the relat-
ivized of each instance of "B + 1-AC with only induction In1n
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to the predicate, Rx = (3s)(3y)(Hf (y) & x < T & (r)(r < s
ks k
-> Qr)), is provable in TG(n + c 3 ) + B + (the sentence
n+c3
"F(n+c3)"). This would give a consistency proof of "B + El-AC
with only I n relative to Con(TG(n+c) + B + ,(the sentence
n+c3
"F(n+c3)") . This in turn is immediately generalizable to a
consistency proof of Z1-AC + B relative to Con(T' + B).
Actually, it suffices to consider the case when n > 5.
This lower bound will be convenient later.
So, certainly all instances of In provably relative to R
since the predicate R has small complexity compared to c3 ,
and I is available in TG(n+c 3)
n+c3 n+c3
Certainly, B provably relativizes, since the numbers, and
hence all the arithmetical relations, remain unchanged by taking
this inner model, by fiat.
For similar reasons, clearly ReCA holds in this inner
model. The inner model is non-empty, since Qq, where O.(q),
k
since we assumed that induction on Q is false.
To verify the last, and most important axiom of "B + 1-AC
with only In", first note that since n 2 5, we have that,
in ReCA + In we can prove W(i) by well-known techniques.
Hence (a)(A < _G(n+c3) -> (3ty)H! (y)) is provable in
k ki
TG(n+c). From now on, whenever Q < _G(n+c3 ), we denote the
n+c3 k
unique y above by H f . Then also
(2)(p)(t: ap & < G(n+c3 ) & p _(n+c 3 )] -> Hf < TH)
k k k k k
is provable in TG (n+ c )
n+c
Now suppose that (p)(3g)A(p,g,x) holds relativized to
the predicate R, where we also have Rx. We wish to conclude,
in the theory TG(n+c3) + B + ,"F(n+c3)" that 3 Skolem
n+c
function for the above sentence, h, such that Rh.
So we have (p)(3g)(A(p,g,x) & Rg), A arithmetical. But
consider an integer s satisfying the properties in the defi-
nition of Rg. Since induction fails on k( c 3 for Q, we
see that s < _ G(n+c3 ). It is straightforward to see, using
U 
W(k) and ReCA, that 1) (p)
(A(p,g,x)) & (t)(t <_s -> Hf
k kt
(3s)(s < _G(n+c3) & (3g< TH )
k ks
does not have a < THf wit]
ktt
A(p,g,x)). It is also easy to see that the part of this sentence
to the right of (3ts) can be written in a natural way in 11
form (since t < s -> Hf < H ) Hence consider the 11
kt - T
predicate Ps which holds iff (3p)(stuff to the right of (3!s)
holds of p and s). It is clear that (s)(Ps -> [(s < _
G(n+c3 ) & (r)(r < s > Qr)]). Applying the axiom J
k G(n+c)
we get a l.u.b. in k, call it ko, on the s with Ps. Now
ko < _G(n+c3). Then clearly (r)(r < kt0 -> Qr). So if
k k
ko = G(n+c3 ), then (r)(r < _G(n+c3 ) -> Qr),
k
contradicting
AU
h
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that induction fails on G(n+c3) with Q.
So k0 < _G(n+c3 ). Hence, since (r)(r < _k0 -> Qr), we
khave (r)(r < k 0 -> ar). A similar argument shows that G(n+c3)
cannot be reached by a finite number of iterations of successor
from ko, in the ordering k. But by sentence 1), it is clear
that a Skolem function for our original sentence can be found
recursive in at most a few jumps of H . Hence a Skolem
function can be found satisfying the predicate R.
In retrospect what we have shown is that for each suffi-
ciently large n, " 1-AC with only I + B" is consistent if
TG(n+c3 ) + B + (F(n+c3))" is. Consequently any 1T' sentence
n+c3
provable in £1-AC must also be provable in T'. We now
observe
Lemma 2: T' T.
Proof: It suffices to show that each Jp is provable
in T. But this is clear, since it is well known that T (or
even ust I + ReCA) proves induction for any formula on k,
p
for each p.
Lemma 3: TC Z1-AC.
- 1
Proof: We have to show that for each p, the sentence
(y)(3x)H y (x) is provable in Z1-AC. Let A(q) be the predi-
kp
cate (y)(3x)Hy (x), and we apply induction to A on the
kq
ordering kp. (Remember, the full schema of induction on kp
is provable in E21-AC). If Suc_(r,q), then clearly A(q) ->
Ik
A(r), by taking J-
(r < _q -> A(r)).
k
umps, using ReCA.
Then (r)(r < _q
k
form a Skolem function for this
we do, we can find,
Suppose 1
-> ( 3 x)H Ykr
im_ (q)
k(x)).
&
W
1
sentence, within 1-AC.
(r)
e can
When
recursive in at most a few Jumps of the
Skolem function, a
and so we have A(q
z with Hy
kq
(z). This is true of all
). Hence by induction on kp, we have
_p -> A(q)).
k
By a similar argument to the above, we
obtain (y)(3x)Hy (x).
kp
We have immediately
Theorem 3: £1-AC is a conservative extension of 1T for 2
sentences.
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(q)(q <
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CHAPTER III
In this chapter, we consider the question of ust which
recursive linear orderings can have certain structures placed
on them; namely, hierarchies. It is convenient to consider
more general notions of recursive linear orderings and
hierarchies, than in Chapter II.
We say, in this chapter, RLO+(n) iff ape defines a
recursive linear ordering (as in Chapter II) whose field is
recursively enumerable. For any p Field(n), we let np be
the name for the subordering of n, whose field is all q with
q < p. Thus np itself is an RLO+.
We define H+(x) as 1) (k)(kex -> (3m)(ke(x)m & m E
Field(n)). 2) (q)(q Field(n) -> [(On(q) & 9 < T(x)q) v
(SueC(q,r) & (X)(1) T(X)q) v (limn(q) & [P(r,s) s < nq &
r e (x)S} < (x)q)]).
Note that in ReCA + I, we can define the satisfaction
relation for (codings of) w-models. We can do this, since we
can prove in ReCA + I that (x)(J)(3y)(y x ( j ) ) . Given
He (x), we define the corresponding Mx (a coding of an w-model)
as (a coding of) the sets < T in some (x)m, m Field(n). We
define Reas+(e) the same as in Chapter II, except replace
RLO(e) by RLO+(e). We define lim(e) as (p)(3 q)(p E Field(e)
-> P < eq).
We define W+(e) and W*+(e) the same as in Chapter II,
except replace RLO(e) by RLO+(e).
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We say that NW(e,X) iff RLO+(e) & e is not
founded with respect to X, i.e., 1) (3n)(nEX &
2) there is no e-least member of X.
Lemma 1: Let x have H e+(x), Reas+(e), lim(
for corresponding M x, we have M x ~ W*+(e). In
Lemma is provable in I + ReCA.
Proof: We consider the theory T = I + ReCA +
(they satisfy hypotheses of the Lemma but not the c
We will show that T proves its own consistency.
In the theory T, fix such an x, e and M =
ing Mx . We will show, in T, that this M f T.
It is clear that M I.
Also, since lim(e), we have M g= ReCA.
It remains to show M ) (3z)(3n)(%H(z) & Reas
lim(n) & corresponding Mz -~w,(n)).
Since M ~ W*(e), there is an r and an X
Hr(X) & M = W(r) & < TX there
Fix such an r. Now choose s
is taken to imply implicitly s
We can do this, using Reas(e).
set z < (y)s with H+ (z),
(Y)t) We set n = e . We cla
claim about satisfaction in M
& Reas+ (e) & (ReCA + I), and
X, and hence Y, must be in t
r W(r). So M z J W*+(es ).
well-
n E Field(e))
e). Then
fact this
(3x) (3e)
onclusion).
correspond-
+ (n) &
with
is a set Y with NW(e,Y).
such that 1) Lim e (s ). (This
E Field(e)). 2) NW(Y, e).
Consider (y)s. There is a
and with (t)(t < es -> (z)t =
im that for these values, our
holds. For, since M ~ W(e )
M l= Hr (X) & W(r), we see that
he model M z, and Mz certainly
So certainly M /= (Mz l W*+
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(es )). Note that Mz e M, since lim(e).
This completes the proof that M T.
Hence T proves Con(T), since the Soundness Theorem
can be formalized and proved in ReCA + I.
So, by GCdels Theorem, T is inconsistent. So the Lemma
has been established. In fact, in view of the inconsistency, the
Lemma is provable in ReCA + I.
Theorem 1: If Reas+(e) and W*+(e) (of course, in view
of Reas+(e), W* and W*+(e) are identical notions, since
RLO +(e)), then there is no x with H(x).
Proof: If lim(e), then if there was such an x, then
corresponding M, by Lemma 1, has Mx W*+(e). However,
since every hyperarithmetic set is in M (because W+(e)) we
must have Mx . .W*+(e), which is a contradiction.
If -lim(e), then by Reas(e), there is an m with
lime(m) & there are only finitely many n > em. So W* + (e m ) .
Then argue as above.
Let NTWO(n) be RLO+(n) & no tail of n is well-ordered,
i.e., (p)(p Field(n) -> the subordering on qlq > np) is
not well-founded).
Lemma 2: If Reas+(e) & H(x) & corresponding Mx =
NTWO(n), then Mx I + ReCA + S, where S is the sentence
of Chapter II.
Proof: Let zeM. We wish to show Mz i ReCA + I +
(n)(WZ(n) -> (3w)(HZ(w))). Clearly.lim(e), since Mz
NTWO(n). Hence M z I + ReCA.
8o
Clearly (3s)(s e Field(e) & z T(x)s). Let
n e Field(e) such that the subordering of e defined on
{qls e q en) is satisfied not to be well-founded in the
model Mx . Then Mx satisfies that there is a hierarchy y
(in the generalized sense of this chapter) on a non-well-founded
RLO+, k, the subordering of e defined above, such that (y)p
T' where Ok (p). Then the obvioas generalization of Lemma
5 in Chapter II gives Mx (n)(Wz(n) -> (3w)( (w) &
w Ty)), in view of M m I + ReCA + (3x) NW(k,X).
Lemma 2: The following is provable in I + ReCA + S: If
NTWO(n) & W*+(n) & p Field(n), then (3q)(q > np & NTWO(nq)).
Proof: Choose r e Field(n) with r > np and the
subordering of n determined by {s p • ns < nrj is not well-
founded. We can do this since .W+ (n).
Now consider the N1 predicate, Pt t < nr & the
subordering of n from t to r is well-founded. If P has
no solutions, we are done, for then NTWO(nr).
Harrison (see [2]) has shown that every Nl predicate
which has a solution in Field(n), where W*+(n), has an
n-least solution. His proof uses only principles provable in
I + ReCA, excepting the comparability of recursive well-
orderings. In Chapter II, we showed this comparability Lemma
is provable in I + ReCA + S, by Lemma 2 of Section 2.
So there is an n-least solution to the predicate Pt,
call it q, and we can prove this in I + ReCA + S. By the
way r was chosen, it is clear that q > np. And by the way
q is defined, it is clear that NTWO(q).
Lemma 4: Let Reas+(e), H(x), lim(e). Then correspond-
ing Mx | ~NTWO(e).
Proof: Consider the theory T = I + ReCA + (3e)(3x) (they
satisfy hypotheses, but not conclusion). As in Lemma 1, we
wish to show that T proves its own consistency.
So, we argue in T, that if e and x are chosen so
that they violate this Lemma, then let M = Mx; and we will
show, in T, that M T.
Clearly, as in Lemma 1, MI + ReCA.
It remains to show M f (3z)(3n)( (z) & Reas+(n) &
lim(n) & corresponding Mz . NTWO(n)).
By Lemma 2 of this chapter, M S + I + ReCA. Hence
M C 1 -AC. Now for each p Field(e) with M NTWO(ep),
we have M f (k)(k < ep -> (3X)NW(ep,X)). Hence M (3Y)
(k)(k < eP - > NWM(ep .(Y)k) ) '
By Lemma 3 of this chapter, M i (p)(p E Field(e) -> (3q)
(q > ep & (3Y)(k)(k < eq -> NW(eq, (Y)k))), since M 1 I +
ReCA + S + W*+(e). So again, by M 1-AC, we obtain a
Z M with M (p)(p Field(e) -> (Z)p is (Y,q) with
q > ep & (k)( < eq --> NW(eq,(Y)k))).
Fix such a Z, and let r have 1) r Field(e),
2) Z T(X)r. Let s > er with M = NTWO(s). Consider
(x)s. There is a natural y K T()s such that H (y), and
(t)(t < e s -> (Y)t = (x)t). We set z = y, n = es, in our
claim about satisfaction in M.
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Clearly lim(es) & Reas+ (es). It remains to show corres-
ponding My NTWO(es).
We have M TWO(s), and Z e My. So every set AZ
is in M . Hence My - TWO(eS).
This completes the proof of the self-consistency proving
of T, and hence the inconsistency of T. Hence Lemma 4 must
be true.
Lemma 5: There is an e with W*+(e) & Field(e) = [nln
is even) such that 1) (3x)H(x), 2) (y)(H(y) -> (3X)(X i,
y(10) & NW(e,X))).
Proof: We define a total recursive function F on indices
of the partial recursive functions. We define G(n) to be the
Gadel number of the RLO (field w) associated with the T1
sentence "RLO(n) v (x)(~.H(x))." So for every n, G(n) is
the Gdel number of some RLO. Let F(n) be the RLO+ with
domain {nln is even} defined by P < G(n)q iff 2p <F(n)2q.
By the recursion theorem, there is an e with tpe = PF(e)
Fix such an e. Then e is the Gdel number of an RLO+ whose
field is (nin is even). It is clear that (X)(NW(e,X) -> (3y)
(H(y) & y < T X(10))) & (y)(H+(y) -> (3x)(NW(e,X) & X 
y(10))). Hence W*+(e). For, if not, then W+(e), and
(3x)(NW(e,X) & Hyp(X)), contradicting the 1st conjunct of the
above conjunction. We claim ~W(e). For, if not, then (3y)
(H+(y)), contradicting the 2nd conJunct of the above conjunction.
So by the 1st conjunct, we have (3y)(H+(y)). So e has all
the properties stated in this Lemma.
83
Theorem 2: There are n with W*(n) (hence Field(n) =
, ) such that (x) (H n (x)).
Proof: Take e as in Lemma 5. Take n to be the nat-
ural RLO with 1) the ordering e is an initial segment, 2)
Field(n) = w, 3) the ordering n corresponds to e x (i.e.,
w copies of e).
Now suppose 'H(x). Then Mx NTWO(n) by Lemma 4.
But (3y)(NW(e,y) & y E Mx). Hence there is a z which can be
found recursively in such a y, with the property that no tail
of n is well-founded with respect to z. And z E Mx . But
this contradicts Mx I NTWO(n).
